Author: Shiloh Bates

Shiloh Bates is a Partner and Chief Investment Officer at Flat Rock Global. Prior to joining Flat Rock Global in 2018, Mr. Bates was a Managing Director at Benefit Street Partners, where he worked on corporate acquisitions. Prior to joining Benefit Street Partners in 2016, Mr. Bates was the Head of Structured Products at BDCA Adviser, where he was responsible for investments in collateralized loan obligations (“CLOs”) and publicly traded business development companies (“BDCs”) as well as structuring the firm's credit facilities. He has worked at several CLO managers including Canaras Capital Management, Four Corners Capital Management and ING Capital Advisors. Mr. Bates began his career as an investment banker at First Union Securities. Mr. Bates has invested over $1 billion in CLO securities since 2013.
19 Apr 2024

Podcast: The CLO Investor, Episode 1

What is a CLO (Collateralized Loan Obligation)? What are the different types of CLOs? Why is the CLO market important today? Shiloh Bates is author of CLO Investing with an Emphasis on CLO Equity and BB Notes, and Chief Investment Officer of Flat Rock Global. In this first episode of The CLO Investor, Shiloh provides a primer on CLOs and CLO investing.

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The CLO Investor Podcast, Episode 1

Hi, I’m Shiloh Bates and welcome to the CLO investor podcast. CLO stands for Collateralized Loan Obligations, which are securities backed by pools of leveraged loans. During this podcast series I’ll cover a CLO 101, relevant topics in the CLO industry and interview key market players. I’ll put a heavy emphasis on CLO equity and BB rated securities as those are the securities I find most interesting.

By way of background, I’m the Chief Investment Officer of Flat Rock Global. I’ve spent two decades in the CLO market, working for CLO managers, and investing in CLO securities. And in 2023 I wrote a book on CLO investing. As CLOs are gaining in popularity, I believe investment professionals of all varieties will benefit from understanding this unique market.

Now, let’s get started.

Our first episode is CLO 101. But first off, let’s discuss why the CLO market is important today.

When I started my career, there were around $6 billion in CLO assets under management and a handful of CLO managers. Today there are over one trillion in CLO assets under management and over one hundred different CLO managers.

CLOs, in my opinion, can offer attractive risk adjusted returns for numerous investors with different risk and return profiles. CLOs issue securities rated AAA and sell them to banks and insurance companies, while investors who can handle more risk and might be targeting double-digit returns invest in CLO BB Notes and CLO Equity.

CLO securities are floating rate so there is almost no interest rate duration. The income from CLO securities varies based on the Secured Overnight Funding Rate or SOFR, which is tied closely to the Fed Funds rate. In recent years CLO investors have benefitted from Federal Reserve Interest Rate increases.

I don’t think any MBA programs offer courses in CLOs, but I think they should. The CLO market sits at the intersection of leveraged buyouts, high yield bonds, leveraged loans, credit analysis and securitization.

I like to say that CLOs are a little complicated but in a fun way. And I believe investors who take the time to understand them can be rewarded.

Lots of people enjoyed the movie, The Big Short, and I’ve read the book a few times. In fact, Michael Lewis is one of my favorite authors. But that movie is about CDOs not CLOs. The nomenclature is similar, but the results for investors were not. Both CLOs and CDOs use securitization, which takes a pool of assets and repackages them into other securities. Securitization is a powerful tool, but the quality of the underlying assets is key. CLOs own highly diversified pools of senior secured loans to large US businesses. CDOs from the financial crisis often owned portfolios of subprime mortgages of dubious credit quality. CDOs, as a result, saw defaults on securities rated initially AAA. For CLO equity, which takes the most economic risk, those securities ended with realized IRRs in the high 20% area. If they make a movie about CLOs, I believe it would have a happy ending.

In 2003, there were $16BN of new CLOs created. Twenty years later, in 2023 there were $116BN. During the 2008-2009 Global Financial Crisis CLO, issuance dried up. Excluding this time period, CLO issuance has been on a two decade upswing. The two primary drivers, in my opinion, are investors seeking exposure to actively managed portfolios of first lien loans combined with the performance of CLO securities over extended periods of time.

Let’s get into the CLO structure. The easiest way to think about a CLO is that it’s a simplified bank in one business line, commercial lending. The typical CLO has approximately $500M of assets. The assets are first lien loans that float based on SOFR. The loans are generally secured by all the assets of the company, both physical and intangible. Assets pledged to the lender would usually include cash, accounts receivable, inventory, physical plant, real estate, and any other assets. If a loan were to go bankrupt, the first lien lenders are the first in line for any recovery. These loans are created in leveraged buyouts. Imagine that a private equity firm is buying a company. They might put up half the purchase price in equity. The remainder could be a first lien term loan. The private equity firm wants to lever its investment, because it believes the businesses its acquiring will grow revenue and cash flow over time. In a typical CLO there might be 200 plus of these types of loans. In fact, a requirement to form a CLO is a highly diversified loan portfolio.

The loans in a CLO are actively managed and there are over 100 CLO management firms in the market. Realistically, we have more CLO managers than we could possibly need. The largest publicly traded alternative asset managers all have large CLO management teams. They earn 40 to 50 basis points annually to pick the initial loans that go into the CLO and keep the CLO fully invested during its reinvestment period. The CLO manager’s job is also to keep the CLO passing its many tests.

Many of the leveraged loans that can be found in CLOs were issued by businesses that may be familiar to you. Asurion, for example, is the company that does insurance contracts for Apple and Samsung phones. Cablevision, Virgin Media, and McAfee are a few more familiar names. My gym in New York, Equinox, has a term loan owned by many CLOs and they have great yoga classes too. While these are large companies, you aren’t going to find many of these companies in the S&P 500. Companies like Apple and Google are rated investment grade and borrow at rates too low to be included in a CLO. The borrowers in CLOs are ”speculative grade” with an average rating of single B or B2 from Standard and Poor’s or Moody’s. Fortunately, these loans default rarely, and when they do default, recoveries are usually high. The attraction of lending to speculative grade companies is they pay attractive interest rates to the lender, in this case the CLO. It’s important to note that the pool of loans in a CLO is not random; the borrowers in a CLO are, for the most part, owned by sophisticated private equity firms that did lots of due diligence on the borrower before acquiring it. And the credit quality of the loan is acceptable to the CLO’s manager.

Earlier I mentioned that a CLO might have $500 million of assets. To finance itself, a number of securities will be issued including ones rated AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB and Equity. Of the seven securities, three will be the most important for this podcast. The AAA is critical because it makes up 65% of the CLO’s financing and provides the CLO’s most favorable funding cost. The CLO BB is usually the junior most CLO debt tranche and therefore offers the highest projected CLO debt security return. The CLO equity receives the quarterly profitability of the CLO but takes the first loss risk on any of the CLO loans. CLO equity investors target mid to high teen returns net of expected loan defaults. Similar to my bank analogy, CLO equity returns are generated because the CLO’s assets earn a higher interest rate than the CLO’s financing cost. The result is distributions to the CLO equity are made quarterly.

The beginning of the CLO is often a CLO warehouse, which is used to acquire loans prior to the formation of the CLO. When the CLO begins its life, all of the CLO debt securities that were issued start accruing their interest expense. From the CLO equity investor’s perspective, it’s best to start a CLO with minimum cash, which would be a drag on returns. Once a majority of the CLO’s loans have been purchased in a warehouse, the CLO’s arranger, which are some of the largest US investment banks, find buyers for the CLO’s securities. An indenture is negotiated that details the rules the CLO will follow. The CLO’s reinvestment period usually runs five years. During that time, loans are frequently repaying at par, and the CLO manager is buying new loans with the proceeds. After the reinvestment period ends, when loans repay at par, new loans are not purchased. The cash proceeds are used to repay the AAA CLO debt until it is fully retired. Then proceeds will go to the AA, etc. As the CLO’s highest rated debt repays, so goes the CLO’s lowest cost of capital. From the CLO equity investor’s perspective, as the CLO delevers, the profitability of the CLO is reduced. At some point the CLO’s equity investors will decide the CLO should be called. Calling a CLO means selling all the CLO’s loans and repaying the CLO’s debt securities. After that the remining proceeds are distributed to the CLO equity.

The debt the CLO issues usually has a two-year non-call period on it. That means the rate on the AAA for example cannot be changed. However, after the non-call period, the CLO equity may attempt to refinance the CLO’s debt at lower costs and or extend the reinvestment period of the CLO, this is called a reset. Both of these transactions can be accretive for the CLO equity investor. I’ll do a future podcast on this subject as refinancings, and resets are prevalent in the market today.

A key concept in CLO investing is the value of the self-healing mechanism. In periods of economic stress, defaults on loans pick up. This is negative for CLO equity investors and the other debt investors in the CLO. However, the CLO’s assets, its leveraged loans, are constantly repaying at par. And during the CLO’s reinvestment period, those par proceeds are used to buy new loans. If defaults on the CLO’s loans are picking up, it’s likely that many leveraged loans will be trading at discounts to par value. Purchasing these discounted loans, if they end up paying off at par, provide loan gains that can be a valuable offset to any uptick in loan losses. This is the CLO self-healing mechanism, and it’s powerful.

Why would someone invest in CLO Equity? It provides exposures to actively managed pools of senior secured loans, but with attractive long-term financing attached. CLO equity pays high current income, today in the mid-to-high-teens area.1

Many Investors get exposure to leveraged loans using loan funds or BDCs. In these structures investors take a loss whenever a loan defaults. Usually, I think this is a good risk to take. However, investors in CLOs generally budget for a loan loss reserve using a 2% default rate. If the default rate ends up below this number, it’s likely the CLO equity can outperform the buyer’s base case returns projections. CLO equity projected returns are quoted net of loan losses.

 

CLO equity has low correlation to other asset classes like high yield bonds or the S&P 500. That means investors can potentially increase overall returns and lower the overall risk of client’s portfolios by including CLO equity. Finally, one of the reasons I’ve gravitated to CLO equity as an asset class is that it’s an inefficient market, and an experienced investor can outperform peers.

For CLOs issued between 2002 and 2019, the average CLO equity tranche returned 21% – not too shabby. 2

CLO BBs, on the other hand, which take less risk, returned 9.5% since 2012, which isn’t bad considering how low interest rates were during much of the time period.3 Again, CLO BBs and most of the other CLO’s financing is floating rate.

Now why would someone buy a CLO AAA? Well, none have ever defaulted, so that’s nice. Banks and insurance companies buy them to make a return on a security that requires little regulatory capital, given its high rating. CLO AAAs are, of course, floating rate, and the performance was in sharp contrast to the investment grade bonds that traded down substantially when interest rates increased 2022. I’ve actually never bought a AAA rated CLO Note and probably never will. BBB is the most senior note I’ve owned. The reason is that the CLO’s junior-most tranche, the BB Note, default rarely but pay much higher returns that the AAA. The 30-year default rate on CLO BBs is around 20bps per year, so defaults on these securities are exceedingly rare.4

 

Many financial firms have gotten into trouble because their assets are of longer duration than their liabilities. The banking crisis of the spring 2023 is one prescient example. If the assets are illiquid and the financing market isn’t open when liabilities come due, it can be a big problem. CLOs are structured with financing longer than the expected life of all the CLO’s leveraged loans. There should never be a time when a CLO is a forced seller of assets in a depressed market.

 

CLOs have historically been an asset only available to large institutional investors. Given what I believe are the attractive risk/return characteristics of CLOs and CLO equity and BB Notes in particular, I believe retail investors will increasingly want access to the asset class. And recent years have seen the launch of CLO focused closed-end funds, interval funds and exchange-traded funds or ETFs. The key question for investors is what CLO security best fits their targeted return and risk profile.

 

So, that is your CLO 101 in a nutshell. Throughout the podcast series I’m going to delve deep into the concepts I discussed here. And in the interim, there are also numerous educational resources that can be found on the Flat Rock Global website. Until next time, thanks for listening.

The content here is for informational purposes only and should not be taken as legal, business, tax or investment advice or be used to evaluate any investment or security. This podcast is not directed at any investors or potential investors in any Flat Rock Global Fund.

 

 

Definitions Section:

The Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) is a broad measure of the cost of borrowing cash overnight collateralized by Treasury securities. 

Leveraged Buyout is the acquisition of a company using debt as an important funding source.

High Yield Bonds are debt investments, usually unsecured and fixed rate, that are rated below investment grade.

Leveraged Loans are corporate loans to companies that are not rated investment grade.

Collateralized Debt Obligation – A collateralized debt obligation is a structured finance product that is backed by a pool of assets other than leveraged loans.

Credit Analysis is the process of evaluating the creditworthiness of a borrower.

Securitization divides cash flows amongst different investors in a pool of assets.

Delever is the process by which an asset becomes financed more with equity and less with debt.

Spread is the percentage difference in current yields of various classes of fixed-income securities versus treasury bonds or another benchmark bond measure.

Yield is income returned on investment such as the interest received from holding a security. The yield is usually expressed as an annual percentage rate based on the investment’s cost, current market value, or face value.

 

General Disclaimer Section:

References to interest rate moves are based on Bloomberg data. The credit quality of fixed-income securities and a portfolio is assigned by a nationally recognized statistical rating organization (such as Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, or Fitch) as an indication of an issuer’s creditworthiness. Ratings range from AAA (highest) to D (lowest). Bonds rated BBB or above are considered investment grade. Credit ratings BB and below are lower-rated securities also known as junk bonds.

Any mentions of specific companies are for reference purposes only and are not meant to describe the investment merits of, or potential or actual portfolio changes related to, securities of those companies.

Unless otherwise noted, all discussions are based on U.S. markets and US monetary and fiscal policies.

Market forecasts and projections are based on current market conditions and are subject to change without notice. Projections should not be considered a guarantee. The views and opinions expressed by the Flat Rock Global speaker are those of the speaker as of the date of the broadcast and do not necessarily represent the views of the firm as a whole. Any such views are subject to change at any time based upon market or other conditions and Flat Rock Global disclaims any responsibility to update such views. This material is not intended to be relied upon as a forecast, research, or investment advice. It is not a recommendation, offer, or solicitation to buy or sell any securities, or to adopt any investment strategy. Neither Flat Rock Global, nor the Flat Rock Global speaker, can be responsible for any direct or incidental loss incurred by applying any of the information offered. None of the information provided should be regarded as a suggestion to engage in, or refrain from, any investment-related course of action as neither Flat Rock Global, nor its affiliates, are undertaking to provide impartial investment advice, act as an impartial adviser, or give advice in a fiduciary capacity. This broadcast is copyright 2024 of Flat Rock Global LLC (all rights reserved). This recording may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, or in any form, without the permission of Flat Rock Global. Additional information about this podcast along with an edited transcript may be obtained by visiting FlatRockGlobal.com

 

Source:

  1. Flat Rock Global Market Analytics
  2. Nomura CLO Research
  3. Palmer Square BB Index
  4. Standard and Poor’s
16 Apr 2024

Podcast: CLO Investing at Flat Rock Global

Flat Rock Global CIO Shiloh Bates discusses CLO (Collateralized Loan Obligation) investing on the Capital Allocators podcast with Ted Seides. Learn more about the market characteristics of CLOs, how CLO equity differs from other credit opportunities, and how Flat Rock Global invests in CLO equity and double-Bs.

Ted: Hello, I’m Ted Sades and this is Capital Allocators. This show is an open exploration of the people and process behind capital allocation. Through conversations with leaders in the money game, we learn how these holders of the keys to the kingdom allocate their time and their capital. You can join our mailing list and access premium content@capitalallocators.com.

All opinions expressed by Ted and podcast guests are solely their own opinions and do not reflect the opinion of capital allocators or their firms. This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as a basis for investment decisions. Clients of capital allocators or podcast guests may maintain positions and securities discussed on this podcast.

Ted: My guest on today’s sponsored insight is Shiloh Bates, the Chief Investment Officer at Flat Rock Global, an alternative credit manager specializing in the junior tranches of CLOs. Last year, Shiloh published CLO investing, a comprehensive review of the structure, payoff rules and historical performance of the space. Our conversation covers shiloh’s 25 years spent in and around the space, an overview of the market characteristics of CLOs, attractiveness of CLO equity relative to other credit opportunities and flat rock’s approach to investing in CLO Equity and double Bs before we get going. It’s springtime in New York and that means it’s time for Yankee Baseball. Like each of the last 53 years, I’ve started dreaming about a perfect season with the Yankees finishing 162 and oh, now that’s never come remotely close in the history of Major League baseball and it never will. But after watching the Yankees sweep the Astros on the road, the first four games of the season, thanks to the Fielding and hitting exploits of star Signi, Juan Soto, I’ll quote the great comedian Jim Carrey in the movie Dumb and Dumber.

So you’re saying there’s a chance it’s highly likely by the time you’re listening to this that the perfect season will have ended, but in this moment I’m still dreaming. So as the weather turns and you find yourself outside enjoying the sunshine, but a little sad that your baseball team, hopefully the Yankees won’t be perfect again this year. At least you can turn to that podcast app on your phone and listen to Capital Allocators for about as perfect an hour as you can get each week. Thanks so much for spreading the word. Please enjoy my conversation with Shiloh Bates. Shiloh, great to see you. Thanks for doing this with me.

Shiloh: Yeah, great to be here with you.

Ted: Why don’t you take me back to your background and how that brought you into the world of structured credit?

 

Shiloh: Sure. So I went to Graduate school at Harvard and after graduating I went to work for Wells Fargo as an investment banking analyst, and then at Wells Fargo, basically I think somebody in HR takes a pool of a hundred different investment banking analysts and just assigns them to different groups. I was in financial institutions and one of my initial projects in the group was to work on a financing for a CLO manager. And then two years later actually found myself working for that same CLO manager in Los Angeles. So I worked as a most banking analyst for just a little bit and then quickly transitioned to the buy side.

Ted: When was that?

Shiloh: 1998 when I graduated from grad school and started in the business

Ted: What did the CLO world look like in 98?

Shiloh: So it was a very small little niche of finance. So there was basically about 6 billion in a UM when I joined, and there was six different CLO managers. And today there’s really over a trillion in CLO AUM and about a hundred different active CLO managers.

Ted: So within the 1 trillion of CLO assets. How big is the CLO equity tranches across the industry?

Shiloh: A trillion of CLO AUM The CLO equity tranche is about 10% of the CLO’s financing, so it’s a hundred billion asset class for CLO equity in particular.

Ted: So what was your early experience like in that niche market at the time?

Shiloh: So basically I was a credit analyst picking loans for the CLOs. So there might be 10 or so different loan opportunities that would come across your desk in a month, and your job is to sort through the best opportunities. So the typical loan that goes into A CLO is going to be a first lien and senior secured loan. Today, the loans pay around SOFR plus three and a half to 4%. And basically the idea is that if you’re investing in first lien loans, you’re starting off with a loan to value of around 40%. So you’re not so sensitive to whether or not the economy grows at 2% or 3% or even shrinks a little you’re exposed to is really the situation where the wheels fall off the cart in terms of the company’s business model. So loans with a 40% initial loan to value, they do default, rarely, fortunately. Usually it’s due to some regulatory or technological change or loss of big customers. But as the credit analyst job to sort through the downside risks of the loans that go into the CLO and figure out the ones that survive really, and if there’s a pretty substantial downturn in the economy.

Ted: So from that early experience, looking at a very niche market at the time, what did you see in the evolution of CLOs alongside the rest of structured credit between then and when you started Flatrock?

Shiloh: The growth of CLOs has really been driven by a few factors. So one is that investors, they find lien loans very attractive today, the yield on these loans are close to 10% or higher. So people look at that and say, Hey, if I can get an equity like return and I’m the top of the capital structure, I’m first lien and I’m secured, that’s an opportunity I want to participate in. So in CLOs, people are looking for actively managed exposures to these pools of loans. And then the CLO O securities really up and down the stack have performed very well over the last 30 years. So a lot of people have seen the movie The Big Short, the CLO industry is sometimes painted with the brush of the performance of CDOs, where during the GFC you’d saw defaults really all the way up to AAA securities and initially rated AAA.

Shiloh: And then if you were in Contrast and investor in CLO equity through the financial crisis on a buy and hold basis, a lot of the equity in those deals return high 20% returns, and the debt in the CLOs defaults rarely as well. So performance has been very good over the last 30 years, so that’s going to attract a lot of investors. And then I think the final thing is that pretty much every security in the CLO market is floating rate. So we’ve been benefiting as the federal reserves have been increasing rates, and when you buy A CLO security, you just don’t have the interest rate duration that you might have if you’re buying a high yield bond or an investment grade bond. If you look at the banking crisis of the spring of last year, look, if banks would’ve owned AAA rated CLOs instead of some of the bonds that might be in the Bloomberg aggregate bond index, CLO aaas might’ve traded to 97 cents on the dollar or something like that. Investment grade IG bonds traded into the eighties and sometimes lower. So I think it’s a confluence of all those factors drawn people to the asset class and the reason that I think it’ll continue to grow.

Ted: What was your path from that early experience alongside those cycles in ls?

Shiloh: So initially my job was again, just picking the loans that go into the CLOs. So I did that for about 10 years and then I had opportunity to start investing instead of the loans investing in CLO securities directly. So I started buying CLO double B notes, which are backed by pools of leveraged loans, and then eventually made my way to investing in CLO equity, which is the riskiest part of the CLO trade, if you will. And then the firms that I work for fortunately just saw a lot of growth and that enabled me to expand my skillset and to be one of the larger players in this space over time. So that’s been a lot of fun and I’ve been fortunate in that.

Ted: What was the genesis of writing a book on CLO investing?

Shiloh: So in my role, I spend 80 or 90% of my time investing, but I do need to do some investor education. And during the covid period where I had some extra time on my hands, I decided to just write a little ebook that was 60 pages and we put it on my firm’s website and it described how I go about CLO equity investing. And after I did that, I was really surprised by how many people read it. It was widely circulated in the market, and that gave me the idea of doing a full book. So the book’s, 220 pages, a lot of the writing from it at least initially just came from stuff that we use to educate investors in our pitch decks or our q and as with them. And at the end of the day, it’s like a trillion dollar asset class market now there should be a book. So we wanted to lead with that, and I wrote it in a way where I think people that are familiar with financial concepts, no CLO knowledge is required, just the basic financial concepts, and I think people can benefit from it, and it’s all in there. If you wanted to learn about CLOs a different way, you could do Google searches and there’s tons of different articles, but I tried to make this book the one-stop shop, if you will, for all your CLO knowledge needs.

Ted: I’d love to dive in a little bit maybe through your book about what these investment opportunities are today. So we talked about what the assets are in these pools. Why don’t you talk some about what is involved on the right hand side of these balance sheets?

Shiloh: So the easiest way to think about A CLO is that it’s a simplified bank. So if you buy a share of, for example, bank of America or JP Morgan stock today, basically you’re going to get exposure to maybe 20 or 30 different lines of business. But in ACL O, it’s really just a pure play lending vehicle. So the CLO might have 500 million of assets in it. Again, the loans are almost exclusively first lien floating rate loans. And then to finance that pool of loans, there’s long-term financing and it’s sold in tranches, which are rated AAA at the top, and that’s most senior and secured. And then down to double B, which is the junior most CLO debt tranche. And then there’s the CLO equity, similar to my bank analogy. The loans that the CLO owns its assets, they pay much higher rate than the CLO O’S financing costs.

Shiloh: So that means each quarter there should be a nice amount of profitability that flows to the CLO equity. After all the CLOs debt has been paid and there’s a CLO manager as well that earns a fee, take a look after all the loans in the CLO. So if you’re an investor in CLO equity today, you’re targeting returns in the mid to high teens and basically you’re exposed to any loss on the CLOs loans. So the risk that you’re taking is loans in the CLO default, but fortunately it’s not a unquantifiable risk. It’s you can look back 30 years and by our estimate, the default rate in CLOs is about 2%. So whenever somebody buys a CLO equity tranche, we budget in a 2% default rate into all of our profitability projections. So in ACL O, you might have 200 different loans in there. I’ve never met a CLO manager who goes 200 for 200 unfortunately.

Shiloh: So you kind of budget in a 2% default rate. That’s the game in CLO equity, and that’s supported by very high quarterly cash distribution. So unlike owning SOC and the s and p 500 where you’re counting on capital appreciation maybe as being the biggest part of the return you get in CLO equity, it’s actually the quarterly distributions that come to you right away. So that’s the equity trade in a nutshell. We’re also investors in BB rated notes that works differently. That’s just a debt security where all the loans in the CLO are pledged to you as collateral. There are other debt investors in the CLO that are ahead of you, but if you look back over 30 years, the default rate on CLO BBS is around 20 basis points. So if you compare that to high yield bonds or to levered loans, if you’re just talking about the default rates of indices in general, not what’s in CLOs in particular, but high yield bonds default to like 3% per year loans, and the loan index defaults around 3% per year. So this is really just a small fraction of the default rate. And then today, because C double Bs are floating rate, and because the Fed has hiked so much, we’re getting yields in the 12% plus area and defaults have been really, really minimal. So that’s a pretty compelling opportunity that we’re going after today.

Ted: How do you pencil out? On the one hand, most of that 30 year history was in a declining rate environment. It’s a pretty stable economic environment with lower defaults, so that could be a negative if defaults go up. On the other hand, with rates going up and you own floating rate paper, you’re going to have a higher yield. How do you think about going forward, the balance of those two foror an owner of the underlying loans?

Shiloh: Higher rates is great to the extent that the borrower can make the payments. How we think about that is, well, the initial loan to value, it’s around 40%, maybe 50% at the max. So there’s a lot of junior capital and equity that supports the business. So these loans are created in leveraged buyouts where a large private equity firm, they’re buying a company and they might put up, call it half of the equity or purchase price from the perspective of the borrower, they can either make their interest in principal payments or they can toss the lenders the keys. Those are really the only options. So because the loan to value starts off, we think pretty attractive place, even as rates have gone up, borrowers still have the capacity to make the payments, and even if they didn’t, from the perspective of the private equity firm that owns the company, they’re looking at a future interest rate environment that should be decreasing.

Shiloh: At least that’s what the SOFR forward curve would say. So they would be highly incented to support a business that has decent prospects, that has a good business model, help them make the higher interest payments rather than just turning over the keys to the lender. So that’s for the underlying loans that are in the CLO, depending on the pool of loans in the CLO, you’re still going to see interest coverage ratios. So that compares the amount of cashflow the business produces each year to its annual interest expense. For the most part, the loan pools are going to be above two times, which is still pretty comfortable.

Ted: What are some of the nuances in investing in this space that led you to select the areas that you?

Shiloh: One of the things that’s interesting to me about CLOs and why I gravitated to this segment of the leveraged finance market is it’s very quantitative. In graduate school, I studied statistics among other things when we’re buying a double B note, instead of asking ourselves, Hey, is this one loan a great loan? Is it a defensible business model? Does it have a good management team? Does it have a good competitive position? These are things that we could debate you and I for hours. I don’t know if there’d be a right answer, wrong answer at the end of it, but in CLOs is very different. Hey, I have this pool of first lane senior secured the loans, and as long as seven or 8% of the loans don’t default each year for the next seven or eight years, I’m going to be money. Good. That’s the analysis you can do as a debt investor in CLOs, and I’ve always found that the analysis of pools rather than one specific outcome to be more interesting to me.

Ted: You mentioned at the onset that there are now a hundred different managers of CLOs. I’d love to map out what this investment universe looks like. So of these hundred that create these and manage the CLOs, who are these organizations?

Shiloh: So the biggest alternative asset managers are all going to have large CLO groups. So Blackstone, BlackRock, KKR, Aries, they all have CLO management teams. They earn call it 30 to 50 basis points to put together the initial loan portfolio to keep the CLO fully invested during its reinvestment period, and really to make sure the CLOs passing all its tests. So the CLO managers are competing amongst themselves for capital from people like me. So they do that by having the best performance of the underlying loans in their CLOs, and they also do it by getting the best debt execution on their CLOs. So for me, that’s the two things. Those are two really of the key ingredients that make for good CLO equity returns and also for a nice stable performance of BB rated notes.

Ted: What drives the ability of the manager to get attractive financing?

Shiloh: So the best financing for CLOs comes out of Asia. It’s large Japanese banks and insurance companies that like to buy the aaa and basically they have approved lists, so they have 10 or 15 guys that have somehow made it onto the list. A lot of the criteria it looks to me like from afar is just name recognition. So if it’s a big household name, then that puts them pretty close to the top. But then if you’re not on the list in Asia issuing CLOs is a much harder business because your initial cost of capital is higher, and that means less equity distributions over time. So A CLO management firm might say, Hey, I didn’t get a good debt print for the CLO O, but I’ll cut my management fee or I’ll do something else for you. But the good debt execution really puts the top quartile of managers significantly ahead of anybody else who’s in the business or trying to enter the business.

Ted: When the manager goes to the market to create one these, how do they address the buying market beyond what say that most senior tranch is coming from Asia?

Shiloh: So to form a CLO, really the first thing you need is a CLO equity investor like myself. So without the equity, there’s really not much that can be done. Maybe the manager can put up the equity themselves. Sometimes it’s going to be part of the CLOs permanent financing. Other times it’s maybe a bridge until they locate a third party CLO equity investor like myself. But once you have the equity, then you can set up what’s called the CLO warehouse, and that’s used to acquire loans prior to the formation of the CLO. And then you start marketing the CLOs debt. So the AA then is the most important, and then the other CLO securities, the ones rated AA down to double B, those are important, but less so the AAA is 65% of your funding costs, so you need to get good debt execution there. And then later in the process, the other tranches get filled out. So each CLO has a CLO arranger. They have a team that puts together an indenture which has the rules that the CLO is going to follow, and that negotiates economics with people up and down the CLO capital stack.

Ted: So when you’re looking at the CLO equity and you want to know that they have that attractive debt financing, it sounds like there’s a chicken and egg. If you’re supplying the equity before you know what the terms of the debt will be, how do you resolve that in your research?

Shiloh: The equity needs to be first, but the AAA is probably on deck and there’s probably already been a number of conversations there. So that’s part of it. But another thing is that in my market, it’s very transparent as to which managers are getting the best debt execution. A CO manager might come to me and just say, Hey, I print the tightest AAA in the market. I did it last month and three months before that and I was talking to a Japanese bank, and they seem pretty interested. And so that gets the conversation going. But the other part of this is once you have the equity, you’re in a CLO warehouse and you’re buying loans prior to the formation of the CLO, you have three to six months to figure out the full commitment on the aaa. So if it comes back maybe wider than you might like as an equity investor, you can always just stay in the warehouse and just wait for a better time or better execution.

Ted: What does the universe of the initial equity providers,

Shiloh: So I think there’s about 15 of us. One of the common jokes in the CLO industry is that you go to CLO conferences, of which there’s many, and it’s a common theme that, oh, there’s new investors coming into the market and you kind of always hear this, but really I see the same 15 guys. We are often sharing in the same deals, we’re speaking at conferences together. It is a niche asset class, although it’s grown to be a trillion and it’s just a little bit more complicated than owning a high yield bond directly or a s and p 500 stock or a mutual fund. So it does take a little bit of learning to get up the curve. I think for people who spend the time, I think the risk adjusted returns are very favorable.

Ted: So when you are discussing the value of CLO equity relative to other alternatives of someone who’s looking for a certain type of risk return profile, how do you compare it to the other ways people might get exposure to credit markets?

Shiloh: Great question. So if we’re comparing private credit owned predominantly unlevered, a lot of times you’re going to get in a CLO exposure to the same underlying loans. But the difference is in the CLO, we’re employing this long-term attractive funding cost that comes along with the CLO vehicle. So if you own traded the loans they might pay today, call it a yield of around 9%. So if you’re in an unlevered fund, that’s the yield. Then what investors would get would be less management fees and some loan losses. Now if you’re investing in CLOs, the CLO O comes with attached leverage to it. So it might be the same underlying pool of loans, but you have seven to nine times leverage associated with that. So that’s the leverage that would be similar to US Bank today. So in my business, whenever you see a diversified pool of loans, usually somebody is financing against it.

Shiloh: And the reason is that banks and insurance companies and CO AA investors will give you such attractive financing against a diversified pool of loans. They usually people take it. So it’s that leverage in the CLO that bridges you from the unlevered return to the levered one. And we think for an investor that can have a little bit more volatility on their nav, that at the end of the day doing it with leverage is probably the best way to do it. I think the attraction of CLO equity is that the returns that we’re expecting to earn should pretty much rival what we think you get from the s and p 500, but we also think that you can get the returns with a lot less risk. So somebody putting together a diverse portfolio of assets would find CLO equity can push out their efficient frontier or just have a portfolio with better returns and lower risk.

Shiloh: So I think that’s the selling point for CLO equity is that the distribution of returns around what I’m targeting should be I think a pretty tight distribution. So if you invest in CLO equity, you’re never going to triple your money unless you’re buying something very distressed in a real severe downturn. But at the same time, the probability that you have a negative IRR is extremely low. So by our math, it’s about 6% of CLOs that have had negative IRR. So it’s for somebody who wants to be in the mid to high teens and then not have as much downside risk as they might if they just own individual stock, I think it’s a compelling opportunity for them.

Ted: I’d love to dive into how you go about implementing the investment strategy. How do you start to filter what you’d like to have in your portfolios?

Shiloh: So if you want to buy a CLO equity tranche, your options really are to do it in the primary market where CLOs are being created or you can buy CLOs in the secondary market. So broker dealers, they make markets in these securities. The securities also trade in auction processes. So for example, the seller of CLO equity might put out a notice to the market that says, Hey, in two days I’m going to sell these three securities and I’m looking for the best bids. And people put in bids through broker dealers for that. So the first thing that you need to decide is just where you’re seeing more interesting opportunities for the primary or the secondary market. So what we do is we basically have a tracking sheet which has every CLO opportunity that we’ve ever been shown in it. And the first screen is just, well, you buy A CLO equity tranche very simply, you put in the price and you put in your 2% expected default rate on the loans, and then you’re screening highest to lowest return opportunity.

Shiloh: But it’s much more complicated than that. So if the CLO equity has a higher return associated with it, then you need to delve in and be like, okay, well what’s the reason? And sometimes it’s reasons that are good and that are going to lead to pursue the opportunity, and then other times it’s just not going to be an opportunity that you want to chase. Great reasons to get a high IRR would be I’m buying at a good price, I have good debt execution out of Asia, the CLO manager is working for a reasonable fee. There’s some deal specific things if the CLO equity offers high returns, but the reason is that the loan pool is very spread, well that means, okay, that’s nice for the equity, but a higher spread loan portfolio could result in higher loan defaults over time. So that’s the opportunity that we would screen out.

Ted: As you’re diving into any one of those opportunities, you’ve got a different capital stack on the right hand side of the balance sheet of the CLO, and then you’ve got say, 200 loans on the left hand side. How do you go about doing your research to determine whether you think it’s an attractive opportunity?

Shiloh: So one of the things that we don’t do is deep dive due diligence on the underlying loans. And the reason for that is a few. So one, there’s going to be 200 or 300 different loans in the portfolio. Usually the max loan size is going to be 1% of a UM or thereabouts. And then if we’re talking about broadly syndicated CLOs, the loans are traded. So you could do due diligence on underlying loan, it’s 50 basis points of the loan portfolio, and then you found out three months later the CLO manager traded it and replace it with another loan. So you’re not really going one by one through loans and asking the CLO manager to explain themselves. So there’s some big picture details that are reported by the CLO that would be of interest. So one is the amount of defaulted assets in there, which usually there are going to be the amount of triple C rated assets, so those are loans that you have much higher risk to default.

Shiloh: And then another metric would be the amount of loans trading below a $90 price. So we usually think of loans that are worth 91 cents or higher as being worth par and loans that likely default at that 2% rate. But if the loan at 80 might not have defaulted yet, it might not even be ccc, but you would never buy a CLO with a loan trading at 80 and not make some kind of adjustment in terms of the price you’d be willing to pay. Another thing that we would shy away from is often there’s very high returns offered for CLO equity securities that are short. So the CLO equity might have an eight year life, and if you want to step into that in the secondary with one year to go or something like that, usually you can buy that at returns that would at least model to be very attractive, but that would be the most risky CLO equity securities you can buy because sooner or later the loans will be liquidated and the CLOs debt gets repaid and the equity gets what’s left. And if you’re only really signing up for that last part of the CLO O or you’re not getting a lot of distributions along the way and you’re just interested in the outcome of a liquidation, that’s not a trade that would work for us.

Ted: Along that type of example, how do you think about the active management component by the CLL manager?

Shiloh: So I think active management is very important. You’re paying them 40 basis points on average, and for that, you’re not just getting somebody who’s picked an initial portfolio of loans and then just let us sit there. The CLO managers, the good ones, they’re actively trading their portfolio in the loan market. How that works is, for example, if JP Morgan or B of A is underwriting a new leverage loan, they price that in a way to really incentivize buyers of the loan to come in in the primary transaction. So a new loan might come at a price of 99 cents on the dollar, but it was underwritten in a way that after it was allocated that it’s worth 99 and a quarter or 99 and a half. Some little bump in economics is what you get by playing in the primary market for loans. So a lot of the time, some successful strategies and leveraged loan management would be to be very active in primary where you’re getting loans that trade up incrementally and over time rotating out of loans that might be more risky or just be more seasoned.

Shiloh: So those are some of the strategies they do, but the amount of churn CLO equity investors are definitely looking for managers with more churn of the loan. So that implies active management. Now, it needs to add alpha. It’s not just rotating in and out, but I think that’s a metric that people in my seat are going to focus on. I think there’s also a qualitative component to this, which is I’ve been investing with the same CLO managers for 10 plus years. So when we’re looking at a new CLO in the primary, you can do so much analysis on the underlying loans and how they performed, but qualitatively you’ve already done a few deals with the guys and you can just pull up the CLO positions that you already own with them. And I think that’s obviously something that you need to wait in your decision process.

Ted: You have what sounds like just a massive data. So all of these CLO managers over 10 years, each CLO having 200 names in it, the performance of all those, how do you process all of that information that’s coming in?

Shiloh: A lot of the big investment banks, they have CLO research teams, they’re analyzing the data as well as we are. So they’ll put out a stat that says something like, Hey, in the last year, these are the top 15 managers who have grown the par balance of their loans. Or another bank might say, Hey, these are the managers who reduce their triple C loan exposure. And when you look at that is one of the challenges in evaluating A CLO managers that there’s so many different metrics that you could choose. I could list a dozen of them. At the end of the day, what it really adds up to is what I care about and what our investors care about is the IRR of their deals. But pretty much every market participant I think uses software called intex, which models CLOs very quickly. You can pull up your portfolio and see how it compares to the other CLOs out there. There’s this qualitative element once you’re having a good experience with a CLO manager, it probably would be hard for a newer CLO team to wiggle themselves into the list of people that you’re looking to work with.

Ted: How do you think about putting together your portfolios of CLO equity and debt securities?

Shiloh: So the 90% of the CLO market is broadly syndicated CLOs. So if you look in there, you’re going to find companies who borrow a billion dollars and up basically. And so our focus though at Fire Rock is really middle market CLOs where your typical borrower is going to be 200 to 400 million of revenue. It’s not going to be a company that you’re going to read about in the Wall Street Journal or anything like that, but still going to be a business that provides material product and service in the economy. So what we found is that portfolios of middle market loans, they both pay higher rates to the lender lender, but they also have more favorable loss statistics over time. And on top of that, middle market loans tend to be much less volatile than broadly syndicated loans. And as a result of that, the volatility that you see on middle market, CLO double Bs and middle market CLO equity is just going to be more favorable to that of what you see in the broadly syndicated CLO market. And so that’s where we’re focused is roughly this 10% of the market niche and in this part of the market, instead of there being a hundred managers, there’s about 15 or so that work working with. In a typical year,

Ted: When you build a portfolio, what does it look like in terms of the number of positions or line items that you’ll have

Shiloh: To be diversified in the CLO market? I would say it’s something like having max positions of around 5% of the portfolio. Each CLO again is going to have 200 or 300 different loans in it. You would not need a hundred CLO equity tranches to be diversified. And then two, a lot of the CLOs are going to own similar loans. So for example, Asurion is the largest loan in CLOs today. They do contracts for iPhone and Samsung phones. The insurance contracts, if you go out and buy ACL O, you’ll probably find them in there. I think having call it 20 different CLO equity tranches would result in a pretty diversified portfolio. The one thing you want to be diversified though is just the life of the CLO. So in a diversified CLO fund, you wouldn’t want to own 20 CLO equity tranches all bought in 2021.

Shiloh: We’d want the CLOs bought at different times. And that’s important because the CLO starts its life with a two year no-call period during which the rate on the AAA down to double B, it’s all fixed and you can’t really monkey around with it. But after the two year no-call period comes off. If it’s to the advantage of the equity, you can go into the market and refinance the CLOs debt at lower rates. You can extend the life of the CLO or you can decide to call the CLO O and that’s just liquidating all the loans and getting your money back.

Ted: When you own this portfolio of the 20 CLO equity pieces and you’re getting distributions along the way, what are the structures that you put together look like that you offer to investors that can match the right liquidity that you’d need to optimize how you want to manage this portfolio with the experience of your investors? On the other side,

Shiloh: What we do at Flatrock is we have three different interval funds. They work similar to a mutual fund, so people can buy them with the ticker through an RAA. Actually they’re not available just to the public. Contrast to a mutual fund is that the securities we’re investing in are pretty illiquid. So we’re not in a position to give anybody daily liquidity if they want out. So what we can do is have these 5% quarterly tender periods where people want to tender their shares to us, the fund will buy them back. So this is a great structure I think for CLO equity because the CLO equity does pay these high cash distributions quarterly. So a common question I get asked from our investors is, well, if you’re tendering for 5% of shares, where does the cash come from? And the first answer is, well, the CLO equity pays very high cash distribution. So you have that on hand and then backup answers would be, yes, I also have a line of credit from a bank or I can just borrow or there’s cash on the balance sheet. The interval fund structure is one where I see it taking market share over time. One of our three funds was initially a private BBC, and we converted that into an interval fund because we believe so much in the structure. And then if you’re an investor in an interval fund, it’s the same SEC reporting is mutual fund.

Ted: What are the advantages of that structure compared to say A BDC or even just a portfolio of the loans?

Shiloh: If you contrast it to A BDC, I think one of the challenges for BDC investors is on the one hand, the BDC is like a close end fund. The shares trade around all day, so you can get liquidity really at any time. But the BDC can trade at a premium or discount to book. Unfortunately for BDC investors, usually it’s a discount. So an investor in those shares, they have both the volatility of changes in the underlying prices of securities, but on top of that, the volatility of just the difference between where the funds trade in the market versus the underlying nav. So the end result of that is BDCs are wildly volatile and in a period like Covid for example, that downturn a lot of BDCs cut in half. And well, if that can happen from a portfolio of predominantly secured loans that pay a dividend yield of nine or 10%, the risk reward there I think would feel funny to a lot of people. So I think that’s one of the reasons that people would prefer the interval fund over the BDC.

Ted: And how about compared to just a private credit vehicle?

Shiloh: The primary difference is going to be in liquidity. How the 5% tenders work is that if every single investor tendered at the same time, you’d get back 5% of your money, but realistically, only a small percentage of your investors should be tendering. At the same time, if you want to tender your shares, you should get back a lot of your money from these tenders. If you’re in A-G-P-L-P fund, you’re committed to lockup capital seven plus years. I think it’s becoming pretty tricky for a lot of large institutional investors to make commitments that are that long in duration.

Ted: What is your research team look like to implement the strategy?

Shiloh: We have an investment committee, which is three folks, myself, our CEO and our CFO, and then people who are working on the CLO team. There’s three of us, and CLO investing is not similar to the team structure. You might see at a private equity firm or even a private credit firm, for example, CLOs are modeled in software that everybody uses. So to get a good sense of what’s happening, you pull it up and literally in 10 minutes you have a pretty good idea of what you’re looking at and if it’s interesting. So in CLO LO investing, as you become more senior in your career, you don’t start flying over from 10,000 feet and making broad pronouncements about the market or managers. All the details are super relevant. I’ve been doing this 20 plus years and I’m still reading in dentures and modeling CLOs and involved in all the negotiations that go with putting a CLO together to contrast it with loans.

Shiloh: For example, if you buy a first lien loan with a 40% loan to value, and for some reason there is an error in the model, at the end of the day, you still land at 40% loan to value and you’re probably getting your money back. CLOs and CLO equity in particular, that’s not the case. So CLOs are going to produce a stream of cash flows over time, and then there’s one payment at the end when the CLO is liquidated and people get whatever cash remains, there’s no par payout at the end. A lot of times you’re getting back 40 cents, 50 cents on the dollar. Now over the eight year life of the CLO, you’ve got these very large distributions along the way. Hopefully it nets to a nice return for you, but you don’t get far back at the end. So the modeling of it really needs to be a hundred percent accurate because every dollar is going to be part of that IRR. There’s no magical a hundred cents that comes back to you at the end.

Ted: What does happen at the end as the manager is unwinding the CLO?

Shiloh: So the typical CO is going to have a five-year reinvestment period. And during that time, loans are constantly prepaying at par. The CLO managers going out into the market and they’re buying new loans with the proceeds. Then after the reinvestment period ends, for the most part, that stops. So when a loan prepays at par, instead of buying a new loan, that cash is used to repay at the AAA security first. Then when that’s fully retired down to the aa, so after the reinvestment period ends, the CO is losing its most attractive financing cost. So the CLO equity distributions are declining. Whoever owns 50% or more of the CLO, when they decide that they’ve delivered enough and want their money back, they can notify the CLO manager and tell them to put all the loans out for sale. So the thinking once you get past the end of their reinvestment period, for somebody like me, there’s a few variables that would determine how long the CLO should go.

Shiloh: So one is if you’ve got a really good financing cost, aaa, even if you’re losing it partially over time, it may make sense to just keep it. And then the other function in there would be the liquidation value to the equity. So if for example, we’re in a period where loans have traded down, then there might not be a high liquidation value for the equity. And in that case, you’re not incentive to call a deal if you’re an investor in double bbs, you’re basically trying to figure out what the equity might do. So a lot of the bbs we buy are later in their life and we buy double Bs at discounts to par almost all the time. So the quicker you can get repaid, the better. So when we’re buying double B securities, we’re figuring out, hey, which of these CLOs are interesting call candidates? Which ones would we call if we were the equity? And that’s part of our decision making and how we filter out the double Bs that we buy.

Ted: If you look at the drivers of your return over time, how much of it is the year over year yield that accrues down to the double equity and how much of it comes from the unwinding of the portfolio?

Shiloh: So one of the things that’s interesting about CLOs is that I mentioned they have this two year no-call period on them in which you can’t really tinker with your AAA and double B or what they are. But after that, what we hope to do with a lot of our CLOs is really have them as permanent capital vehicles. So I mentioned that the reinvestment period might be five years, but if you go out five years and the CLO has performed well, your incentive to just try to go back into the market and extend the CLO O’S life and add another five year reinvestment period to it. So by doing that, you skip two to three years of potential de-leveraging and receiving lower cash flows. Instead of having that period, you just stay fully invested and keep going. So a transaction like that would be very accretive for the equity.

Ted: What are some of the other nuances of how you can drive returns for your investors through the structures?

Shiloh: Let me give you an example of some of the upside that I think exists in these deals that we try to take advantage of as an equity investor. So I mentioned there’s refis, there’s CLO life extensions every quarter after the reinvestment period ends, the CLO equity investors looking to maximize their returns. It may be the case that a call one year after the reinvestment period is the ideal one for the equity and it could go as long as four years. So that’s some other upside that comes to us. I think another source of potential outperformance for equity fund, something that I’ve done and I think our competitors have done to some extent as well, is that if I rewind the clock to the spring of 2020 CLO securities are trading at really discounted levels. So if you’re an investor in CLO equity, you don’t have a crystal ball for how quickly the economies going to recover.

Shiloh: So equity feels a little bit scary, especially when some of the underlying businesses in the CLO aren’t even open for business. That’s obviously not good. But at the same time, what we did is we looked at CLO double B notes that were trading in the market in the sixties, seventies, and eighties. And in looking at those, you just ask yourself, okay, well what percentage of the underlying loans would have to default such that I’m not money good on this double B? And even during covid, we saw double BS as securities that we expected to be really rock solid. So we are a CLO equity fund, and I put equity in quotes now because after COVID started, we were buying double Bs. We felt like, hey, you can get equity-like returns here or better and be more senior and de-risk yourself. Why wouldn’t you do that? So a lot of times people who are investors in CLO equity are looking to the double B as a potential alternative. And when those are trading at discounts, that can be a pretty compelling place to look for a turn rather than your more traditional trade.

Ted: So you’ve experienced an incredible growth in the industry you’re participating in for a long time. What do you think happens from here over the next five or 10 years in this part of the market?

Shiloh: I think the market continues to grow probably at a mid single digit clip. I think that we talked earlier about drivers being people wanting exposure to first lien loans, the performance of CLO securities over time. And I think it’s partially just an education process. So when we’re marketing our funds to investors, a lot of the times they’re not familiar with private credit, they’re not familiar with CLOs or even traded loans. There’s a lot of education. I think that’s what’s being done. SOFR is a little bit less than 5.5% today. If you’re lending, again, 4% above that, people are going to find that to be a pretty attractive yield that I think is just going to pull more and more people into the space.

Ted: Closing before your hobby or activity outside of family,

Shiloh: Almost every night I go to the jiujitsu studio and train that with the guys. What I really like about it is it’s both a mental challenge and also physically exhausting. There’s the comradery of training with the same team every day. But the other part of it is that in Jiujitsu, you are 100% present. You’re just really in the moment trying to deal with the immediate problems. And it also teaches you how to learn and acquire new skills and really think about the best way for you to learn new movements and tricks. I find it to be really enjoyable.

Ted: What’s one fact you find interesting that most people dunno about you?

Shiloh: So once I started working, I did two years on the sell side and then transitioned, I think I worked for six years on the buy side in Los Angeles. And then after that, that would’ve been a time where a lot of people in my position would’ve maybe gone back to school and gotten an MBA. But I had already done the CFA and I had a master’s in public policy where there would’ve been some overlap with an MBA. So what I decided to do is I took a sabbatical and traveled the world for two years. So I visited over 20 countries, learned Spanish, I learned Portuguese, I still speak Spanish, Portuguese is gone. Unfortunately, I also did a lot of surfing. So I’m from a lower middle class family, and we didn’t have the opportunity to take a lot of vacations when I was younger, and I took that two years to see the world and really enjoy life.

Ted: What’d you learn most from that experience?

Shiloh: One of the standout experiences for me was living in Rio where a lot of people are living in favelas or slums and they’re living on maybe $5 a day or something or less. But when you meet these people, when you spend time with them, they’re some of the happiest people in the world. They’ve got the Brazilian flag painted inside their home, they’re playing soccer on the beach, they’re swimming in the ocean. And if you compare that to a lot of guys who might have a corner office on Wall Street, the contrast is just so stark, and I think it just shows you the value of being fulfilled or being happy with what you have and thinking about ways to live your life in a way that you can get that enjoyment and satisfaction.

Ted: What’s your biggest pet peeve?

Shiloh: My biggest pet peeve at work at least, is where people reach out to you trying to sell you something, but don’t really have anything that they’re offering back. So let me give you the example from the perspective of how we do fundraising. One way would be to call a bunch of RAs and family offices and say, Hey, we want you to invest in our fund. Okay, we want that. Why should they want that? The better way to do it is to offer something instead of to ask. So what we offer is education, education on private credit, on CLOs. We have the clo o investing book that I wrote and other resources. So we’re reaching out to people. We want something, but we have something to offer. And I think it’s important that people try to think about framing what they want in a way where maybe something’s coming back to the other person.

Ted: Which two people have had the biggest impact on your professional life?

Shiloh: So I think the two biggest people are going to be the two people in HR who took an Excel spreadsheet with a hundred names on it of people from different universities and decided which industries they were going to cover. So I think we like to go through life thinking. We’re in charge of everything that’s happening to us, what’s happening around us as a result of our hard work or lack thereof or of the smart calculated risks that we’re taking. But in reality, there’s a lot of random things that affect our life in huge ways and assigning me to the financial institutions group, that’s what resulted in us chatting here today. It could be in another universe. I could have been in the telecom group and who knows where I’d be. Unfortunately, I’m pretty happy with how it worked out.

Ted: What’s the best advice you’ve ever received?

Shiloh: So one of the things that I do, and one of the things I think we try to do as a firm is to take the most generous interpretation of what’s happening in a situation where you feel like you’re not being treated well or you don’t like what the other person’s doing. Instead of jumping to the conclusion, oh, assigning the worst motivations to the person, instead really assigning the best. Somebody shows up late to a zoom call. The worst impression would be, okay, this is somebody who’s not motivated or didn’t care or didn’t prioritize this, and the best is, Hey, you just don’t know what other people have going on in their life. I make an effort daily to go with the generous one. And start with that.

Ted: What life lesson have you learned that you wish you knew a lot earlier in life?

Shiloh: I found that I really like learning. So I have three different master’s degrees. I studied public policy at one point, financial mathematics and statistics, and then after graduate school, instead of learning in the academic environment where you’re really spoonfed information to try to learn things as an adult. So just like I go to the gym multiple times a week and I’m working out whatever muscle group, I try to treat my brain the same way. So I’m constantly learning new things. So piano, I mentioned jujitsu. I try to stay current with Spanish and just always finding mental challenges. I think that’s, at least for me, it’s a key to feeling good during the day, and I think it might keep you a little younger as well.

Ted: Shiloh, thanks so much for sharing this incredible education on CLO investing.

Shiloh: Thanks for having me, Ted. That’s great.

 

Ted: Thanks for listening to this sponsored Insight. Sponsored episodes are paid opportunities for another 12 managers a year to appear on the podcast. If you’re interested in telling your story in front of the largest audience of investors in the industry, please email us at team@capitalallocators.com to apply for one of the slots.

The thoughts and opinions expressed in the article are solely those of the author. The discussion of individual companies should not be considered a recommendation of such companies by the Fund’s investment adviser. The discussion is designed to provide a reader with an understanding of how the Fund’s investment adviser manages the Fund’s portfolio.

09 Feb 2024

Video: CLO Investing Overview

What is a CLO (Collateralized Loan Obligation)? How do CLOs work? What are the different types of CLOs? Flat Rock Global CIO Shiloh Bates answers these questions and more in this webinar replay.

Hi everybody, I’m Shiloh Bates. I’m the CIO of Flat Rock Global, and today I’m going to walk you guys through an educational presentation on CLOs. We call it CLO 101, and we’re not going to talk about our funds today, just the basics of CLOs. So just by way of background, for those of you who I haven’t met in the past, I started my career, it’s a little bit over 20 years ago, and in the CLO space, I’ve invested over 1,500,000,000 in CLO securities with Bob Grunwald, my firm’s founder. We’ve done that over the last 10 years, but basically my entire career is either working for CLO managers, picking the loans that go into CLOs or investing in CLO securities, debt and equity directly. And I recently wrote a book on CLO investing that’s available on Amazon.

So why learn about CLOs? Well, one thing today is it’s a $1 trillion AUM market. When I joined, it was about 6 billion of AUM, so it’s grown quite a bit. And one of the key reasons is that the market offers what I think is pretty attractive risk adjusted returns and people interested in CLOs can find investment opportunities from AAA rated notes, which are going to be the safest investments to CLO equity, which has the potential for mid-teen returns or better and takes more risk in the CLO market. Pretty much everything is floating rate. So it floats based in the past on LIBOR and now on three months SOFR. And the floating rate’s been very beneficial obviously in the last two years. And I describe CLOs as just a little bit complicated, but in a fun way. That’s how I think about it.

So one thing to know is that CLOs are very different from the failed CDOs of the past. So for example, I loved Michael Lewis’s book, the Big Short, but CLOs have their collateral is first lien senior secured corporate loans. And in contrast, the CDOs had subprime mortgages or mortgages of dubious credit quality In there securitized number of different, and the easiest way to think about it is if you’re securitizing quality assets, the outcomes over time can be quite favorable. And if you’re not securitizing good assets, there’s really nothing that securitization can do to improve the outcome in Closs. There’s lots of transparency in terms of how they report to us. And the CLOs are managed by really the largest US asset managers out there. The underlying loans tend to not be correlated because each CLO O is going to have a number of different industries represented in it and lots of different borrowers. And historically, as I mentioned, returns have been favorable, really up and down the CLO stack from AAA to equity. In the case of CDOs, you had defaults even in the investment grade tranches.

So annual CLO issuance, you can see that the trend has been up over time during the GFC there were just a few is issued. But what’s been driving this in my opinion, is really a few things. So one is the attractive returns that CLO investors have received over time and investors’ willingness and desire to get exposure to portfolios of first lien senior secured loans. That’s what’s driving this. And what ends up in CLOs are loans made to US companies that have usually undergone a leveraged buyout. So are private equity firms buying a company and they need, firstly in debt to finance part, usually half of the acquisition and a lot of those loans become the fuel for CLO. So as private equity a UM has grown. So too has CLO AUM.

So the typical broadly syndicated CLO structure, it is going to be about 500 million of assets. So these are first lien loans, again, floating rate. They’re secured by all the assets of the company. So that could be property plan and equipment, inventory, accounts receivable, intangible assets, it’s all in there pledged to the lenders. And again, these loans are created usually in leverage buyouts. And then the CLO is finance with investment grade debt that’s rated triple A down to triple B, it sold to insurance companies and banks primarily. We were actually not an investor in the investment grade part, but we do invest in double B notes. So these are the junior most debt that’s issued by the CO. And we’re also an investor in first loss equity. And basically if you’re an investor in the equity, the CLO is going to distribute to you very high quarterly income. And when I say high mean high teens and it comes to you each quarter and then you’re on the hook if and when loans default, you’re on the hook. But fortunately that risk isn’t like an unknowable risk. And I’ll talk through how we think about that as an equity investor. But simplistically, this is just like a pure play US bank. All it’s doing is lending the rate on the assets is higher than the CLO is financing costs in that creates some inherent profitability in the CLO.

So the biggest CLO managers today, Blackstone, Palmer Square, Elmwood, PGM, which is Prudential to name a few. So these guys are paid 40 to 50 basis points to manage the CLOs loans during the CLOs life and keep the CLO on sides with all the CLOs. Many tests. So at Fire rock, we’re investors in double Bs and equity. We don’t manage the underlying pools of loans. That’s a function that’s outsourced to the guys here in this ranking from Creditfluxx. So the typical loans in A CLO are going to start their lives with about a 50% loan to value. So there’s going to be a lot of equity capital, some junior debt capital in there as well. And what that means is that for one of these companies to default, defaults really are not going to be caused by just an increase in interest rates or some supply chain issues, inflationary costs that are not passed along to the end investor. What really causes default is a fundamental change in a business that comes from left field. So that could be a technological change, a regulatory change, a loss, an unexpected loss of a top two or three customers, stuff like that can put you into a default. But generally, as long as the business lose 50% of its enterprise value, then you should expect full repayment when the loan comes to.

So if you look into a broadly syndicated CLOs today, you’re going to see some names that may be familiar to you. So Asurion is a provider of wireless handset insurance. So they do that for iPhones and some Samsung phones as well. And then there’s other names here, which Cable Vision, Virgin Media, McAfee to name a few. So there’s some large US businesses that are represented in CLOs today, and each CLO though is going to have 200 different loan issuers in it. So historically, when loans default, you’ve gotten back close to two thirds of your money. And this is JP Morgan data. It goes all the way back to 1990. And how they measure the recovery is they take the trading price of the loan 30 days after default. They call that the recovery. Well, in ACL O, the CLO manager is not required to sell defaults.

Usually they work through the default. Typically, a loan might be restructured into a new loan of smaller size with some equity warrants attached to it. And so the recovery really plays out over time. And the expectation from the CLO manager’s perspective would be to get a recovery that’s higher than what’s shown here. But this is just the trading price 30 days after, and it’s much higher than high yield bonds. So high yield bonds are basically a promise to pay. They’re unsecured and the bond doesn’t get a recovery unless the first lien loans are made whole generally. And then the second liens, same thing. The second liens is only getting a recovery if the first lien is made whole generally.

So this is the lifecycle of a CLO. There’s a lot on here. But basically before the CLO is formed, usually an investment bank with an equity investor decide to open a CLO warehouse, and the warehouse is used to acquire loans prior to the formation of a CLO. And that’s true because when the CLO begins its life, the AAA down to the double B, all that debt starts accruing its interest. And so when the CLO starts its life, you want to have many loans purchased as possible so that you don’t have a negative cash track. And so the warehouse period might be four to six months where the CLO manager is slowly acquiring loans, then there’s what’s called the CLO pricing date, that’s the date at which financing is secured for the CLO. And investors have agreed on all the terms once the CLO closes, that’s really kind of the CLO formation date.

And then shortly thereafter, the CLO is going to start paying distributions to the debt and to the equity for the first, call it two years of the CLO’s life, there’s a no-call period on the CLO’s debt. And what that means is that during that time, the rate on the AAA, for example, it is what it can’t be changed for the benefit of the equity. But after two years, if it’s possible to go into the market and get a better financing rate for the AAA or the double B or whatever it is, the equity investors are going to want to do that. And similarly, if it’s in the interest of the equity to do a CLO life extension, which is also called a reset in the market that just extends the CLO’s life, it extends its reinvestment period. Those are things that can happen after the no-call period.

And then the reinvestment period ends. This is generally five years after the CLO closes and before the reinvestment period ends, every time the loan prepays a par, the CLO manager just goes into the market and buys a new loan with those proceeds. So the CLO is fully levered during its entire life through the well during their reinvestment period is. And then after the reinvestment period ends, when loans prepay a par, that cashflow is used to first repay the AAA, then the AA. And so slowly the CLO just naturally delvers and the CLO de-leveraging results in lower distributions for the equity. And so at some point, the equity’s going to decide to call the deal, and that is basically selling all the loans, repaying all the debt that’s left, and the remaining proceeds would be distributed to the equity. So all this could take eight years for the CLO, maybe another half year for the warehouse. If you do any CLO life extensions, that would add another five years to the CLO. So these are vehicles that are going to be around for quite some time.

So if you’re an investor in CLO BBs versus CLO equity, there’s some things that are very different in terms of the profile of these securities. And let me just kind of go back up here to show you the CLO diagram. So I’m going to compare how to think about the world from the perspective of the double B note here in orange, which is a debt security and the green CLO equity, which just takes the remainder of the cash flows that the CLO receives after all the interest is paid on the C’S debt and after some operating expenses of the CLO.

So if you’re an investor in double Bs, the CLO equity is a buffer against losses. So you’re not expecting to take any losses in the double B because equity has signed up to be that first loss risk. If you’re an investor in CLO double Bs, your return should be the cashflow you receive from the base rate, the floating rate of SOFR plus your spread. But if you’re an investor in CLO equity, again, you just sit at the bottom of the waterfall and whatever payments are left remain to you after the contractual payments, people above you and the waterfall, that’s what you get. You sweep up whatever’s left at the end. If you’re an investor in double Bs, you’re taking lower risk and expecting lower returns than CLO equity. And if you’re in the CLO double Bs, you have really no right to dictate how long the CLO is outstanding. You’re basically along for the ride. And if you’re in the CLO equity, you have certain rights where you can call a deal that’s decide to liquidate all the loans. You can refinance different tranches or reset the CLO after the no-call period. CLO BBSs are pretty liquid in secondary trading. And CLO equity has some liquidity but less than the CLO BB.

So some of the characteristics of CLO equity that I think are unique, one is that it’s an actively managed exposure to a diversified portfolio of these first lean loans. And again, by actively managed, I mean that we’re hiring a CLO manager who’s going to be one of the best and biggest investors in credit in the country. CLO equity offers very high current income. So if you invest in the S and P 500 for example, most of the return you’re expecting is just appreciation in shares. The dividend rate is quite low. Whereas for CLO equity, it’s the opposite. The return that you’re getting is actually coming from the quarterly distributions that you get. CLO equity has the potential for equity like returns, so returns similar to the s and p 500, but with a low correlation to the s and p 500 and to high yield bonds as well.

In each CLO, there’s a loan loss reserve. And basically what that means is that when we buy a CLO equity piece, we see there’s 200 different loans in the CLO for example, we know that no CLO manager is going to go 200 for 200. There’s always going to be some cats and dogs that default. And so what we do is we look back over the last 30 years and we see that there’s roughly a 2% default rate in CLO portfolios. And historically the recovery rate in CLOs is about 70%. And so we put that into all of our projection models. So when we buy a CLO equity piece, we never assume we’re going to go get all the loans par back. That’s not how the business works. But we have this loan loss reserve. And so when loans default, often like how we look at it is, oh, okay, that’s a budgeted default.

And when I talk about the returns that I’m targeting, that’s net of this loan loss reserve. So today, CLO equity investors are targeting high teen returns, and that’s net. That’s after 2% of the loans default and recover 70. And then I think potentially one of the most intriguing and advantageous parts of investing in CLO equity is that in recessionary periods what happens is you would expect that the default rate in your CLOs picks up, but at the same time, really in any market loans are constantly prepaying at par and those par proceeds are reinvested into new loans. And in a recession, the CLO manager should be able to buy new loans at a pretty interesting discount to par value.

If you look at the last almost two years, for example, our usual modeling assumption is that when a loan prepays, a new loan will be bought at 99 cents on the dollar. Well, for the last two years, the Morningstar loan index has had an average price of around 95. And so each time a loan repaid, presumably the collateral manager bought a new loan at a nice discount. And those discounted loans have the potential to increase profitability of the CLO over time. And it’s also a very valuable offset to any increased loan losses that you take in our recessionary period. Then finally, it’s an inefficient market with a potential for alpha. So each CLO equity tranche is about 50 million. There’s a couple of different holders of it, and our view is that if you’ve been around for a while and know what you’re doing, there’s a potential to really outperform your peers.

The one way to think about CLO equity returns simplistically is just what’s the chance that I have a negative IRR? And so we looked at deals from 2002 to 2020 and saw that less than half percent, less than 5% had negative IRRs. And the ones that were negative were basically mildly negative, negative 5%, negative 10, stuff like that. And there’s a few reasons for this. So one is that when the CLO begins its life, it starts making these very large equity distributions right out of the gate. And so in your first year you might get 20% of your investment back, and in the second year you’re at 40. And so just over time you’re just kind of naturally de-risking yourself. So that’s really helpful. The CLO self-healing mechanism that I described earlier where the CLO manager has the potential to buy discounted the loans in recessionary periods, that’s valuable. And then the other part of it is just the general quality, the high quality of the first lien loan portfolios that you can find in CLO o. So I think all these combined result in this pretty favorable positive distribution.

In terms of CLO self-healing, let’s go into this in some detail. So usually the loan market is trading around 99 cents on a dollar. So that’s the Morningstar loan index that you see here in Orange, and that’s where it ended. 99 is basically where it ended the year 2021. Well as risk premium went up throughout 2022 and into this year, the loan index sold off. And during this time the prepayment rate on loans is around 10 to 15%. So it wasn’t a very high prepayment rate number, but still loans were slowly repaying in the CLO and each time that happened, a discounted loan was bought with those proceeds. Now the CLOs are generally going to buy loans that are a little bit more conservative than the loan index. So if the loan index is at 95, they might be buying loans at 97 or something like that. But this has been an extended period where CLO managers have been able to buy discounted loans, and this has the potential to materially increase CLO equity returns over time. And it’s also beneficial to the debt investors and the CLO as well because if you’re buying discounted loans that ultimately mature par, that’s going to be more collateral that backs the position of the AAA down to the double B.

So one way to think about CLO equity returns is just to look at vintages. So this is the start date of A CLO and in this dataset, we stopped it at 2017 because for 2018 and beyond, the CLOs are still outstanding. So there’s not a realized return yet to show you, but we think those CLOs are doing well and are going to result in returns that are kind of comparable to previous vintages. But one of the things that really stands out here is the 2007 vintage CLO. And this is really surprising to a lot of people. So if you bought a CLO equity piece right before the financial crisis, you ended up with almost a 30% IRR. So why would that be? So imagine again, you bought this, you’re like the CLO analyst who is buying a unique CLO piece. In 2007, you were assuming a 2% default rate and a 70% recovery rate consistent with history.

And in 2008, you would’ve found in 2009 that the default rate was much higher than you would’ve initially expected. So the default rate peaked at about 8%. And so that’s obviously very negative for CLO equity. But at the same time, the index of loans traded down really into the sixties during the GFC and that enabled CLOs to buy lots of loans at discounts over time. And the loan market remained dislocated for a period of three to four years. And given the amount of discounted loans that were bought by the CLOs over time, that was actually more beneficial to returns than the elevated losses they took during the GFC. So the self-healing mechanism actually net net was positive for CLO equity. And so instead of earning a return of, call it mid-teens, which is probably what was targeted in 2007, it ended up being twice that and that’s the power of the self-healing mechanism.

So here’s a simple kind of income statement if you will for ACL O. So the loan interest rate today certainly elevated because of how SOFR has moved with fed hikes, but basically a 9% rate is floating on the assets, but it’s SOFR plus three and a half percent. The cost of debt is also going to be floating rate seven and a quarter today CLO manager fees on average about 40 basis points. And I mentioned that whenever we buy ACL O, we assume that 2% of the CLOs assets will default. Usually it’s a 30% loss in a default. So that’s the 60 basis points there. And so the levered return, so 75 basis points, so that’s the return that you earn on each turn of leverage, you’re making the 75 basis points. So that’s the loan interest rate, less the cost of debt, less management fees, and the loan loss reserve. And so with the CLO being levered nine times, what you pick up is 6.7, 6.75% in terms of the return. And then you also have an unlevered portion. So the formula there is just the loan interest rate less CLO manager fees and loan loss reserve. There’s no debt tied to one turn of the CLOs financing. And so when you add up the two items at the bottom, the total projected return in this example is 14.75%.

So if you’re interested in looking back at some historical returns for CLO equity, we made an index and it’s available on our website and it goes back to 2014, that’s when we had a sufficient dataset to create the index and we updated quarterly with a little bit of a lag. So now moving back to CLO double Bs. So again, the junior most debt tranche of the CLO, when you buy A CLO double B, that really simple question you’re asking yourself is what percentage of the underlying loans would have to default such that we’re not money good in the BB level? So here I’m going to just go back to the diagram for a quick second. So it’s just again, if you’re an investor here, these assets are your collateral and you just want to know how bad losses could be over here, such that all the equities even through and you start taking losses at the double B level. Really that’s the analysis.

And so we use some software called Intex that that models CLO cash flows to help us figure that out. And on average it’s about a 7% annual default rate per year for seven years to have a CLO double B that’s impaired. When we say impaired, we mean really just not receiving $1 of contractual interest and principal payments. So it’s not like a negative IRR or a total wipe, it’s just losing a little bit of the return that you you’re expecting. And so what we show here is the JP Morgan default rate over time. So you can see in orange, you can see that defaults peaked during the GFC at about 8%, but shortly thereafter, the default rate tends to normalize to the 2% area. You can also see some elevated defaults during the covid period as well. But what the blue line is showing you is that for a double B to default, you need that 7% default rate to happen for seven years, not just retreat quickly to a normalized level. And so what this shows to me is that these CLO double B notes are very robust, and that’s also true for the triple B, which is even more robust and up the stack. And then at Flatrock, we are investors in middle market BBs where there’s even more equity contributed to the deal upfront, and those survive like a 15% default rate annually over the seven year life of ACL O. So both middle market CLOs and broadly syndicated CLO double Bs we think are a very high credit quality.

So if you’re an investor in a double B, there’s a two things that benefit you at the end of the day. One is obviously the equity that signed up to take the first losses on the loan portfolio. But the second is this schematic here, which shows that if A CLO starts to underperform, and by that I mean there’s too many CCCs CCC rated loans or defaulted loans, instead of making the equity distribution, that cash is going to be retained in the CLO, it’s going to be used to buy more loans, which would be more collateral for the double B investor and other debt investors in the CLO or the cashflow could be used to dele the CLO. So both of those are beneficial really to all the debt holders.

And this is a very powerful tool because the equity distributions I mentioned earlier are in the high teens today. So there’s a lot of cashflow that’s available In a downside case, there’s a lot of cashflow that’s available, which could be used for the benefit of the double be holders. Now, the Closs today generally are performing quite well. None of ’em, none really are diverting cash flows in this way, but it’s a potential benefit and a downside case for all the debt holders in the CLO. So historically, high yield bonds have defaulted at about a 3% rate leverage loans at 2.9. Now, this is what I’m quoting here is are the indices. So if you look in CLOs specifically, the default rate for leveraged loans is going to be lower than the 2.9%, but if you compare that to the default rate for CLO double B notes, it’s about 25 basis points is the default rate. And hopefully that kind of jives with this previous slide that showed how robust these are through the GFC through covid. This chart is, I think it really kind says it all in terms of the credit quality here. And then the other benefit obviously is this, the ability to self-heal the CLOs debt tranches. So that’s what’s resulted in a very low default rate for CO BBSs over time, and that’s why we decided to launch a fund that’s dedicated to CO double Bs.

So some of the lessons that I’ve learned in my career investing in CLOs, one is that you really do need deep knowledge on the asset class and you need to have connection with all the investment banks that underwrite these CLOs and that trade CLOs in the secondary market. And one reason for that, it goes back to the size of the CLO tranche. So if an investment bank is working on selling a $50 million equity tranche or a 30 million BB for example, they can’t really go out to the entire world. And the reason is that if a number of people decide they want to do it, then they’re going to have a problem and there’s only 50 million for sale. So they’re going to have a lot of unhappy customers at the end of the day. So especially in equity, the investment banks tend to go to their top clients first for the most interesting transactions. And then if those clients pass on the opportunity, then they’re calling down a list. And if you’re kind of like a tourist to the asset class, if you’re new to the asset class, you’re probably not going to be high on anybody’s list and you’re probably going to miss some of the best transactions out there.

We also think it’s very important to have a broad mandate in CLOs. And so that means specifically that our targeted investments are middle market CLO equity, broadly syndicated, CLO equity, broadly syndicated BBs, middle market double Bs. We invest in CLO warehouses, which again are the vehicles that are used to acquire loans prior to the Closs formation. We do the equity in those, we invest in the primary market where CLOs are created. We invest in the secondary market where Closs that already exist are treated. And over time we see different opportunities across all those spaces and we think it’s best practice to be nimble and be able to move around and capture that value over time.

At Fire Rock for example, we are not a CLO manager, so there’s no kind of in-house team that we’re supporting with our funds. So there’s a hundred different CLO managers out there. We’re not wedded to any of ’em. We have some quantitative and qualitative metrics we use to distill the top a hundred managers to the top quartile or so, but there’s no kind of in-house cooking that we’re putting into the funds. And one of the things I’ve seen in the past is that when a CLO equity team is tied to a CLO manager, when that CLO manager is forming new CLOs, a lot of times there’ll be a few CLO securities that aren’t sold. So maybe there’s 5 million of a AAA that wasn’t sold for whatever reason or parts of a double B, and then the investment bank’s like, Hey, well why don’t you put that into one of your internal funds? There’s obviously a conflict there and we suggest that people try to find managers that avoid that conflict.

We like CLO double Bs, we like them surprisingly, even at times where if all the loans were liquidated today, the double B would not be covered. And that sounds a little bit scary, but if you remember how the double B, the self-healing works is that when the CLO O is underperforming equity, CLO equity distributions get turned off. And so you have, when the distributions are turned off, the nav should be, or the fair market value of the loans should be increasing over time. So that can move you back on sides. And at the end of the day, a lot of times loans trade off the traded loan market often moves with high yield, but at the end of the day, loans either prepay you a par or they default. Those are really the only options. And even when loans have kind of sold off some, usually the end result given they start their lives at a 50% loan to value is that you just get your money back at the end.

So loan might be trading in the mid nineties today, that’s actually where the loan index is, but we’d feel really good about getting a par recovery in most cases. And then we really like middle market CLOs at Fire Rock. So we have one fund that’s primary mandate is middle market loans owned directly on our balance sheet. Middle market loans are unique in that each of the CLOs is going to have a very different collateral pool than CLOs managed by other middle market managers. And there’s some portfolio characteristics that we also think make middle market CLOs very appealing.

So if you’d like to know more, again, I did write a book on CLO investing. It’s available on Amazon and we’re happy to send you a copy if you’d like. But this is written in a way where it’s written from the perspective of an investor. So before this book, you could Google CLOs and there’d be a lot of different information that you could piecemeal together to educate yourself. But what’s different here is that in a lot of parts of it I’m describing really the framework that we use to buy equity and double Bs, the same framework that is used to buy double Bs is also applicable all the way up the stack to aas. It’s the exact same thought process.

Last year I saw an intro to CLOs that was written that went around the market and it was written by lawyers and they started off the book saying, A CLO is a bankruptcy remote vehicle do mess outed in the Cayman Islands with, and they went through the legal ease of it. And I’m reading it, I’m like, okay, well that’s all true. But this book is designed to capture the economics of the trade. And I think with just some basic financial knowledge that it is written for somebody with just some basic financial knowledge and hopefully people will find it interesting and if they read the book and still have additional questions, they should feel free to reach out. So with that, I’m going to stop here. Thanks a lot for joining us today. I really appreciate it. But again, we’re always happy to answer your question, so feel free to reach out to me or your salesperson and hope you have a great afternoon. Thanks.

Hi everybody, I’m Shiloh Bates. I’m the CIO of Flat Rock Global, and today I’m going to walk you guys through an educational presentation on CLOs. We call it CLO 101, and we’re not going to talk about our funds today, just the basics of CLOs. So just by way of background, for those of you who I haven’t met in the past, I started my career, it’s a little bit over 20 years ago, and in the CLO space, I’ve invested over 1,500,000,000 in CLO securities with Bob Grunewald, my firm’s founder. We’ve done that over the last 10 years, but basically my entire career is either working for CLO managers, picking the loans that go into CLOs or investing in CLO securities, debt and equity directly. And I recently wrote a book on CLO investing that’s available on Amazon.

So why learn about CLOs? Well, one thing today is it’s a $1 trillion AUM market. When I joined, it was about 6 billion of AUM, so it’s grown quite a bit. And one of the key reasons is that the market offers what I think is pretty attractive risk adjusted returns and people interested in CLOs can find investment opportunities from AAA rated notes, which are going to be the safest investments to CLO equity, which has the potential for mid-teen returns or better and takes more risk in the CLO market. Pretty much everything is floating rate. So it floats based in the past on LIBOR and now on three months SOFR. And the floating rate’s been very beneficial obviously in the last two years. And I describe CLOs as just a little bit complicated, but in a fun way. That’s how I think about it.

So one thing to know is that CLOs are very different from the failed CDOs of the past. So for example, I loved Michael Lewis’s book, the Big Short, but CLOs have their collateral is first lien senior secured corporate loans. And in contrast, the CDOs had subprime mortgages or mortgages of dubious credit quality In there securitized number of different, and the easiest way to think about it is if you’re securitizing quality assets, the outcomes over time can be quite favorable. And if you’re not securitizing good assets, there’s really nothing that securitization can do to improve the outcome in CLOs. There’s lots of transparency in terms of how they report to us. And the CLOs are managed by really the largest US asset managers out there. The underlying loans tend to not be correlated because each CLO is going to have a number of different industries represented in it and lots of different borrowers. And historically, as I mentioned, returns have been favorable, really up and down the CLO stack from AAA to equity. In the case of CDOs, you had defaults even in the investment grade tranches.

So annual CLO issuance, you can see that the trend has been up over time during the GFC there were just a few issued. But what’s been driving this in my opinion, is really a few things. So one is the attractive returns that CLO investors have received over time and investors’ willingness and desire to get exposure to portfolios of first lien senior secured loans. That’s what’s driving this. And what ends up in CLOs are loans made to US companies that have usually undergone a leveraged buyout. So are private equity firms buying a company and they need, firstly in debt to finance part, usually half of the acquisition and a lot of those loans become the fuel for CLO. So as private equity AUM has grown, so too has CLO AUM.

So the typical broadly syndicated CLO structure, it is going to be about 500 million of assets. So these are first lien loans, again, floating rate. They’re secured by all the assets of the company. So that could be property plan and equipment, inventory, accounts receivable, intangible assets, it’s all in there pledged to the lenders. And again, these loans are created usually in leverage buyouts. And then the CLO is finance with investment grade debt that’s rated triple A down to triple B, it sold to insurance companies and banks primarily. We were actually not an investor in the investment grade part, but we do invest in double B notes. So these are the junior most debt that’s issued by the CO. And we’re also an investor in first loss equity. And basically if you’re an investor in the equity, the CLO is going to distribute to you very high quarterly income. And when I say high mean high teens and it comes to you each quarter and then you’re on the hook if and when loans default, you’re on the hook. But fortunately that risk isn’t like an unknowable risk. And I’ll talk through how we think about that as an equity investor. But simplistically, this is just like a pure play US bank. All it’s doing is lending the rate on the assets is higher than the CLO is financing costs in that creates some inherent profitability in the CLO.

So the biggest CLO managers today, Blackstone, Palmer Square, Elmwood, PGM, which is Prudential to name a few. So these guys are paid 40 to 50 basis points to manage the CLOs loans during the CLOs life and keep the CLO on sides with all the CLOs. Many tests. So at Flat Rock, we’re investors in double Bs and equity. We don’t manage the underlying pools of loans. That’s a function that’s outsourced to the guys here in this ranking from Creditfluxx. So the typical loans in A CLO are going to start their lives with about a 50% loan to value. So there’s going to be a lot of equity capital, some junior debt capital in there as well. And what that means is that for one of these companies to default, defaults really are not going to be caused by just an increase in interest rates or some supply chain issues, inflationary costs that are not passed along to the end investor. What really causes default is a fundamental change in a business that comes from left field. So that could be a technological change, a regulatory change, a loss, an unexpected loss of a top two or three customers, stuff like that can put you into a default. But generally, as long as the business lose 50% of its enterprise value, then you should expect full repayment when the loan comes due.

So if you look into a broadly syndicated CLOs today, you’re going to see some names that may be familiar to you. So Asurion is a provider of wireless handset insurance. So they do that for iPhones and some Samsung phones as well. And then there’s other names here, which Cable Vision, Virgin Media, McAfee to name a few. So there’s some large US businesses that are represented in CLOs today, and each CLO though is going to have 200 different loan issuers in it. So historically, when loans default, you’ve gotten back close to two thirds of your money. And this is JP Morgan data. It goes all the way back to 1990. And how they measure the recovery is they take the trading price of the loan 30 days after default. They call that the recovery. Well, in ACL O, the CLO manager is not required to sell defaults.

Usually they work through the default. Typically, a loan might be restructured into a new loan of smaller size with some equity warrants attached to it. And so the recovery really plays out over time. And the expectation from the CLO manager’s perspective would be to get a recovery that’s higher than what’s shown here. But this is just the trading price 30 days after, and it’s much higher than high yield bonds. So high yield bonds are basically a promise to pay. They’re unsecured and the bond doesn’t get a recovery unless the first lien loans are made whole generally. And then the second liens, same thing. The second liens is only getting a recovery if the first lien is made whole generally.

So this is the lifecycle of a CLO. There’s a lot on here. But basically before the CLO is formed, usually an investment bank with an equity investor decide to open a CLO warehouse, and the warehouse is used to acquire loans prior to the formation of a CLO. And that’s true because when the CLO begins its life, the AAA down to the double B, all that debt starts accruing its interest. And so when the CLO starts its life, you want to have many loans purchased as possible so that you don’t have a negative cash track. And so the warehouse period might be four to six months where the CLO manager is slowly acquiring loans, then there’s what’s called the CLO pricing date, that’s the date at which financing is secured for the CLO. And investors have agreed on all the terms once the CLO closes, that’s really kind of the CLO formation date.

And then shortly thereafter, the CLO is going to start paying distributions to the debt and to the equity for the first, call it two years of the CLO’s life, there’s a no-call period on the CLO’s debt. And what that means is that during that time, the rate on the AAA, for example, it is what it can’t be changed for the benefit of the equity. But after two years, if it’s possible to go into the market and get a better financing rate for the AAA or the double B or whatever it is, the equity investors are going to want to do that. And similarly, if it’s in the interest of the equity to do a CLO life extension, which is also called a reset in the market that just extends the CLO’s life, it extends its reinvestment period. Those are things that can happen after the no-call period.

And then the reinvestment period ends. This is generally five years after the CLO closes and before the reinvestment period ends, every time the loan prepays a par, the CLO manager just goes into the market and buys a new loan with those proceeds. So the CLO is fully levered during its entire life through the well during their reinvestment period is. And then after the reinvestment period ends, when loans prepay a par, that cashflow is used to first repay the AAA, then the AA. And so slowly the CLO just naturally de-levers and the CLO de-leveraging results in lower distributions for the equity. And so at some point, the equity’s going to decide to call the deal, and that is basically selling all the loans, repaying all the debt that’s left, and the remaining proceeds would be distributed to the equity. So all this could take eight years for the CLO, maybe another half year for the warehouse. If you do any CLO life extensions, that would add another five years to the CLO. So these are vehicles that are going to be around for quite some time.

So if you’re an investor in CLO BBs versus CLO equity, there’s some things that are very different in terms of the profile of these securities. And let me just kind of go back up here to show you the CLO diagram. So I’m going to compare how to think about the world from the perspective of the double B note here in orange, which is a debt security and the green CLO equity, which just takes the remainder of the cash flows that the CLO receives after all the interest is paid on the C’S debt and after some operating expenses of the CLO.

So if you’re an investor in double Bs, the CLO equity is a buffer against losses. So you’re not expecting to take any losses in the double B because equity has signed up to be that first loss risk. If you’re an investor in CLO double Bs, your return should be the cashflow you receive from the base rate, the floating rate of SOFR plus your spread. But if you’re an investor in CLO equity, again, you just sit at the bottom of the waterfall and whatever payments are left remain to you after the contractual payments, people above you and the waterfall, that’s what you get. You sweep up whatever’s left at the end. If you’re an investor in double Bs, you’re taking lower risk and expecting lower returns than CLO equity. And if you’re in the CLO double Bs, you have really no right to dictate how long the CLO is outstanding. You’re basically along for the ride. And if you’re in the CLO equity, you have certain rights where you can call a deal that’s decided to liquidate all the loans. You can refinance different tranches or reset the CLO after the no-call period. CLO BBSs are pretty liquid in secondary trading. And CLO equity has some liquidity but less than the CLO BB.

So some of the characteristics of CLO equity that I think are unique, one is that it’s an actively managed exposure to a diversified portfolio of these first lean loans. And again, by actively managed, I mean that we’re hiring a CLO manager who’s going to be one of the best and biggest investors in credit in the country. CLO equity offers very high current income. So if you invest in the S and P 500 for example, most of the return you’re expecting is just appreciation in shares. The dividend rate is quite low. Whereas for CLO equity, it’s the opposite. The return that you’re getting is actually coming from the quarterly distributions that you get. CLO equity has the potential for equity like returns, so returns similar to the s and p 500, but with a low correlation to the s and p 500 and to high yield bonds as well.

In each CLO, there’s a loan loss reserve. And basically what that means is that when we buy a CLO equity piece, we see there’s 200 different loans in the CLO for example, we know that no CLO manager is going to go 200 for 200. There’s always going to be some cats and dogs that default. And so what we do is we look back over the last 30 years and we see that there’s roughly a 2% default rate in CLO portfolios. And historically the recovery rate in CLOs is about 70%. And so we put that into all of our projection models. So when we buy a CLO equity piece, we never assume we’re going to go get all the loans par back. That’s not how the business works. But we have this loan loss reserve. And so when loans default, often like how we look at it is, oh, okay, that’s a budgeted default.

And when I talk about the returns that I’m targeting, that’s net of this loan loss reserve. So today, CLO equity investors are targeting high teen returns, and that’s net. That’s after 2% of the loans default and recover 70. And then I think potentially one of the most intriguing and advantageous parts of investing in CLO equity is that in recessionary periods what happens is you would expect that the default rate in your CLOs picks up, but at the same time, really in any market loans are constantly prepaying at par and those par proceeds are reinvested into new loans. And in a recession, the CLO manager should be able to buy new loans at a pretty interesting discount to par value.

If you look at the last almost two years, for example, our usual modeling assumption is that when a loan prepays, a new loan will be bought at 99 cents on the dollar. Well, for the last two years, the Morningstar loan index has had an average price of around 95. And so each time a loan repaid, presumably the collateral manager bought a new loan at a nice discount. And those discounted loans have the potential to increase profitability of the CLO over time. And it’s also a very valuable offset to any increased loan losses that you take in our recessionary period. Then finally, it’s an inefficient market with a potential for alpha. So each CLO equity tranche is about 50 million. There’s a couple of different holders of it, and our view is that if you’ve been around for a while and know what you’re doing, there’s a potential to really outperform your peers.

The one way to think about CLO equity returns simplistically is just what’s the chance that I have a negative IRR? And so we looked at deals from 2002 to 2020 and saw that less than half percent, less than 5% had negative IRRs. And the ones that were negative were basically mildly negative, negative 5%, negative 10, stuff like that. And there’s a few reasons for this. So one is that when the CLO begins its life, it starts making these very large equity distributions right out of the gate. And so in your first year you might get 20% of your investment back, and in the second year you’re at 40. And so just over time you’re just kind of naturally de-risking yourself. So that’s really helpful. The CLO self-healing mechanism that I described earlier where the CLO manager has the potential to buy discounted the loans in recessionary periods, that’s valuable. And then the other part of it is just the general quality, the high quality of the first lien loan portfolios that you can find in CLO o. So I think all these combined result in this pretty favorable positive distribution.

In terms of CLO self-healing, let’s go into this in some detail. So usually the loan market is trading around 99 cents on a dollar. So that’s the Morningstar loan index that you see here in Orange, and that’s where it ended. 99 is basically where it ended the year 2021. Well as risk premium went up throughout 2022 and into this year, the loan index sold off. And during this time the prepayment rate on loans is around 10 to 15%. So it wasn’t a very high prepayment rate number, but still loans were slowly repaying in the CLO and each time that happened, a discounted loan was bought with those proceeds. Now the CLOs are generally going to buy loans that are a little bit more conservative than the loan index. So if the loan index is at 95, they might be buying loans at 97 or something like that. But this has been an extended period where CLO managers have been able to buy discounted loans, and this has the potential to materially increase CLO equity returns over time. And it’s also beneficial to the debt investors and the CLO as well because if you’re buying discounted loans that ultimately mature par, that’s going to be more collateral that backs the position of the AAA down to the double B.

So one way to think about CLO equity returns is just to look at vintages. So this is the start date of A CLO and in this dataset, we stopped it at 2017 because for 2018 and beyond, the CLOs are still outstanding. So there’s not a realized return yet to show you, but we think those CLOs are doing well and are going to result in returns that are kind of comparable to previous vintages. But one of the things that really stands out here is the 2007 vintage CLO. And this is really surprising to a lot of people. So if you bought a CLO equity piece right before the financial crisis, you ended up with almost a 30% IRR. So why would that be? So imagine again, you bought this, you’re like the CLO analyst who is buying a unique CLO piece. In 2007, you were assuming a 2% default rate and a 70% recovery rate consistent with history.

And in 2008, you would’ve found in 2009 that the default rate was much higher than you would’ve initially expected. So the default rate peaked at about 8%. And so that’s obviously very negative for CLO equity. But at the same time, the index of loans traded down really into the sixties during the GFC and that enabled CLOs to buy lots of loans at discounts over time. And the loan market remained dislocated for a period of three to four years. And given the amount of discounted loans that were bought by the CLOs over time, that was actually more beneficial to returns than the elevated losses they took during the GFC. So the self-healing mechanism actually net net was positive for CLO equity. And so instead of earning a return of, call it mid-teens, which is probably what was targeted in 2007, it ended up being twice that and that’s the power of the self-healing mechanism.

So here’s a simple kind of income statement if you will for a CLO. So the loan interest rate today certainly elevated because of how SOFR has moved with fed hikes, but basically a 9% rate is floating on the assets, but it’s SOFR plus three and a half percent. The cost of debt is also going to be floating rate seven and a quarter today CLO manager fees on average about 40 basis points. And I mentioned that whenever we buy a CLO, we assume that 2% of the CLOs assets will default. Usually it’s a 30% loss in a default. So that’s the 60 basis points there. And so the levered return, so 75 basis points, so that’s the return that you earn on each turn of leverage, you’re making the 75 basis points. So that’s the loan interest rate, less the cost of debt, less management fees, and the loan loss reserve. And so with the CLO being levered nine times, what you pick up is 6.7, 6.75% in terms of the return. And then you also have an unlevered portion. So the formula there is just the loan interest rate less CLO manager fees and loan loss reserve. There’s no debt tied to one turn of the CLOs financing. And so when you add up the two items at the bottom, the total projected return in this example is 14.75%.

So if you’re interested in looking back at some historical returns for CLO equity, we made an index and it’s available on our website and it goes back to 2014, that’s when we had a sufficient dataset to create the index and we updated quarterly with a little bit of a lag. So now moving back to CLO double Bs. So again, the junior most debt tranche of the CLO, when you buy a CLO double B, that really simple question you’re asking yourself is what percentage of the underlying loans would have to default such that we’re not money good in the BB level? So here I’m going to just go back to the diagram for a quick second. So it’s just again, if you’re an investor here, these assets are your collateral and you just want to know how bad losses could be over here, such that all the equities even through and you start taking losses at the double B level. Really that’s the analysis.

And so we use some software called Intex that that models CLO cash flows to help us figure that out. And on average it’s about a 7% annual default rate per year for seven years to have a CLO double B that’s impaired. When we say impaired, we mean really just not receiving $1 of contractual interest and principal payments. So it’s not like a negative IRR or a total wipe, it’s just losing a little bit of the return that you’re expecting. And so what we show here is the JP Morgan default rate over time. So you can see in orange, you can see that defaults peaked during the GFC at about 8%, but shortly thereafter, the default rate tends to normalize to the 2% area. You can also see some elevated defaults during the COVID period as well. But what the blue line is showing you is that for a double B to default, you need that 7% default rate to happen for seven years, not just retreat quickly to a normalized level. And so what this shows to me is that these CLO double B notes are very robust, and that’s also true for the triple B, which is even more robust and up the stack. And then at Flat Rock, we are investors in middle market BBs where there’s even more equity contributed to the deal upfront, and those survive like a 15% default rate annually over the seven year life of ACL O. So both middle market CLOs and broadly syndicated CLO double Bs we think are a very high credit quality.

So if you’re an investor in a double B, there’s a two things that benefit you at the end of the day. One is obviously the equity that signed up to take the first losses on the loan portfolio. But the second is this schematic here, which shows that if a CLO starts to underperform, and by that I mean there’s too many CCCs CCC rated loans or defaulted loans, instead of making the equity distribution, that cash is going to be retained in the CLO, it’s going to be used to buy more loans, which would be more collateral for the double B investor and other debt investors in the CLO or the cashflow could be used to dele the CLO. So both of those are beneficial really to all the debt holders.

And this is a very powerful tool because the equity distributions I mentioned earlier are in the high teens today. So there’s a lot of cashflow that’s available In a downside case, there’s a lot of cashflow that’s available, which could be used for the benefit of the double be holders. Now, the CLOs today generally are performing quite well. None of them, none really are diverting cash flows in this way, but it’s a potential benefit and a downside case for all the debt holders in the CLO. So historically, high yield bonds have defaulted at about a 3% rate leverage loans at 2.9. Now, this is what I’m quoting here are the indices. So if you look in CLOs specifically, the default rate for leveraged loans is going to be lower than the 2.9%, but if you compare that to the default rate for CLO double B notes, it’s about 25 basis points is the default rate. And hopefully that kind of jives with this previous slide that showed how robust these are through the GFC through COVID. This chart is, I think it really kind says it all in terms of the credit quality here. And then the other benefit obviously is this, the ability to self-heal the CLO’s debt tranches. So that’s what’s resulted in a very low default rate for CO BBSs over time, and that’s why we decided to launch a fund that’s dedicated to CLO double Bs.

So some of the lessons that I’ve learned in my career investing in CLOs, one is that you really do need deep knowledge on the asset class and you need to have connection with all the investment banks that underwrite these CLOs and that trade CLOs in the secondary market. And one reason for that, it goes back to the size of the CLO tranche. So if an investment bank is working on selling a $50 million equity tranche or a 30 million BB for example, they can’t really go out to the entire world. And the reason is that if a number of people decide they want to do it, then they’re going to have a problem and there’s only 50 million for sale. So they’re going to have a lot of unhappy customers at the end of the day. So especially in equity, the investment banks tend to go to their top clients first for the most interesting transactions. And then if those clients pass on the opportunity, then they’re calling down a list. And if you’re kind of like a tourist to the asset class, if you’re new to the asset class, you’re probably not going to be high on anybody’s list and you’re probably going to miss some of the best transactions out there.

We also think it’s very important to have a broad mandate in CLOs. And so that means specifically that our targeted investments are middle market CLO equity, broadly syndicated, CLO equity, broadly syndicated BBs, middle market double Bs. We invest in CLO warehouses, which again are the vehicles that are used to acquire loans prior to the CLO’s formation. We do the equity in those, we invest in the primary market where CLOs are created. We invest in the secondary market where Closs that already exist are treated. And over time we see different opportunities across all those spaces and we think it’s best practice to be nimble and be able to move around and capture that value over time.

At Flat Rock for example, we are not a CLO manager, so there’s no kind of in-house team that we’re supporting with our funds. So there’s a hundred different CLO managers out there. We’re not wedded to any of ’em. We have some quantitative and qualitative metrics we use to distill the top a hundred managers to the top quartile or so, but there’s no kind of in-house cooking that we’re putting into the funds. And one of the things I’ve seen in the past is that when a CLO equity team is tied to a CLO manager, when that CLO manager is forming new CLOs, a lot of times there’ll be a few CLO securities that aren’t sold. So maybe there’s 5 million of a AAA that wasn’t sold for whatever reason or parts of a double B, and then the investment bank’s like, Hey, well why don’t you put that into one of your internal funds? There’s obviously a conflict there and we suggest that people try to find managers that avoid that conflict.

We like CLO double Bs, we like them surprisingly, even at times where if all the loans were liquidated today, the double B would not be covered. And that sounds a little bit scary, but if you remember how the double B, the self-healing works is that when the CLO O is underperforming equity, CLO equity distributions get turned off. And so you have, when the distributions are turned off, the nav should be, or the fair market value of the loans should be increasing over time. So that can move you back on sides. And at the end of the day, a lot of times loans trade off the traded loan market often moves with high yield, but at the end of the day, loans either prepay you a par or they default. Those are really the only options. And even when loans have kind of sold off some, usually the end result given they start their lives at a 50% loan to value is that you just get your money back at the end.

So a loan might be trading in the mid nineties today, that’s actually where the loan index is, but we’d feel really good about getting a par recovery in most cases. And then we really like middle market CLOs at Flat Rock. So we have one fund that’s primary mandate is middle market loans owned directly on our balance sheet. Middle market loans are unique in that each of the CLOs is going to have a very different collateral pool than CLOs managed by other middle market managers. And there’s some portfolio characteristics that we also think make middle market CLOs very appealing.

So if you’d like to know more, again, I did write a book on CLO investing. It’s available on Amazon and we’re happy to send you a copy if you’d like. But this is written in a way where it’s written from the perspective of an investor. So before this book, you could Google CLOs and there’d be a lot of different information that you could piecemeal together to educate yourself. But what’s different here is that in a lot of parts of it I’m describing really the framework that we use to buy equity and double Bs, the same framework that is used to buy double Bs is also applicable all the way up the stack to AAs. It’s the exact same thought process.

Last year I saw an intro to CLOs that was written that went around the market and it was written by lawyers and they started off the book saying, A CLO is a bankruptcy remote vehicle do mess outed in the Cayman Islands with, and they went through the legal ease of it. And I’m reading it, I’m like, okay, well that’s all true. But this book is designed to capture the economics of the trade. And I think with just some basic financial knowledge that it is written for somebody with just some basic financial knowledge and hopefully people will find it interesting and if they read the book and still have additional questions, they should feel free to reach out. So with that, I’m going to stop here. Thanks a lot for joining us today. I really appreciate it. But again, we’re always happy to answer your question, so feel free to reach out to me or your salesperson and hope you have a great afternoon. Thanks.

07 Feb 2024

Podcast: Shiloh Bates on the CLO Investing Opportunity

Flat Rock Global CIO Shiloh Bates reviews some CLO (Collateralized Loan Obligation) basics and shares potential CLO investing opportunities in an interview with Will Wainewright on the Alternative Fund Insight podcast.

DISCLOSURES

Past performance is not indicative of future results.

This is not an invitation to make any investment or purchase shares in any fund and is intended for informational purposes only. Nothing contained herein constitutes investment, legal, tax or other advice, nor is it to be relied on in making an investment or other decision. Nothing herein should be construed as a solicitation, offer or recommendation to acquire or dispose of any investment, or to engage in any other transaction.

For further information please email info@flatrockglobal.com

ALPS Control Number: FLT000395

22 Jan 2024

Key Questions from Clients in 2023

Is private credit a bubble?

Relevant for: Leveraged loans, CLO BBs, and CLO Equity

We do not believe private credit is a bubble. As a result of Federal Reserve interest rate hikes, middle market loans yields are now in the low double-digits. In the typical corporate capital structure, the more risk you take, the higher the required return. However, middle market loans could offer returns well in excess of where many economists project long-term equity returns to be. Middle market loans are senior and secured and therefore typically offer more downside protection than high yield bonds or equities. Standard and Poor’s estimates that private equity firms have raised $2.5 trillion that has yet to be deployed.1 We believe much of that capital will be used to buy middle market businesses in transactions where the loan will make up less than 50% of the purchase price. A substantial equity contribution from a private equity sponsor provides downside protection for the middle market loan investor. This favorable risk / return dynamic for middle market loans hasn’t existed for the last fifteen years, in our opinion.

Middle market loans are owned in long-term non-mark-to-market funds. The market should not see any forced selling of middle market loans due to margin calls. The result is more stable loan pricing over time.

Middle market lending has never been a zero-loss investment opportunity. Unforeseen events can push some business into default. When we model CLOs, we include a 60bps loss rate on the loans, consistent with the historical loss rate in those portfolios. Prior to the increase in interest rates, we believe most middle market loans were paying a fixed spread of approximately 5.0% over a LIBOR floor of 1.0%. Now, middle market loans pay the spread over the Secured Overnight Funding Rate (SOFR), which finished the year at 5.3%. The additional yield of 4.3% could provide an attractive offset for any increase in loan losses that could result from a slowing economy.

Outside of traditional middle market lending, we see risk in broadly syndicated loans where the loan documentation did not adequately protect creditors’ rights. We also see risk in second lien loans and unsecured debt, where if the loans were to default, recoveries would be much lower than first lien loans.

Can borrowers afford higher interest rates?

Relevant for: Leveraged loans, CLO BBs, and CLO Equity
We believe that most companies that issue leveraged loans will be able to pay the higher rates that have resulted from Federal Reserve interest rate increases. By our estimation, interest coverage ratios of middle market borrowers have declined from ~3.7x at year-end 2021 to ~2.0x at year-end 2023.2 Rate increases were long expected, but the Federal Reserve certainly did not expect that it would have to raise interest rates to current levels to tame inflation. The interest rate markets now expect SOFR rates to normalize in the 3.0% area in 2025.3

Higher interest rates have resulted in less cash flow for middle market businesses, but that has been partially offset by the borrowers growing revenue and profitability. At the end of the day, corporate borrowers either make their contractual interest and principal payments, or the lenders take over the business and work for the best loan recovery possible. Given the average initial loan-to-value for senior secured loans is around 50%, there is significant equity and junior capital financing each borrower. We believe that the private equity firms would rather support their existing portfolio companies for what is expected to be another year or two of higher rates, rather than take a total loss on their equity investment. Higher interest rates have resulted in a favorable shift in economics away from private equity for the benefit of senior secured lenders.

Where we’ve seen borrowers struggle, the cause is usually some input cost pressures that can’t be passed along to customers or the loss of key customers to competitors. If the business is tracking to plan, the higher rates are manageable, in our opinion.

The SOFR forward curve predicts that SOFR will decline by 2.5% over the next two years,3 increasing borrower cash flow and liquidity. Of course, higher for longer has been a smart wager.

When / if refis and CLO extensions will be possible?

Relevant for: CLO Equity
The potential for significant upside could exist in CLO Equity if the CLO can refinance its debt at lower rates, or if the reinvestment period can be extended on favorable terms. Since the beginning of 2022, CLO financing costs have been elevated, and these transactions have been rare. Last year the CLO AAA spread over SOFR declined from 2.1% to 1.6%.4 We believe there can be a significant number of refinancings and reinvestment period extensions this year if AAA CLO spreads decline 0.20% from current levels.

In addition, many CLOs issued in 2022 and 2023 have elevated debt costs, relative to current levels. Many of these CLOs are good candidates to extend their reinvestment periods, even if CLO AAA spreads do not decline further.

CLOs issued in 2021 or before, may go their full lives without refinancing their debt or extending their reinvestment periods. In such cases, the CLO equity could benefit from below market financing costs for the CLO’s 8-10 year expected life.

A CLO reinvestment period extension has the potential to add 2% to our base-case projected returns, assuming no change in the CLO’s cost of debt. The value of refinancing portions of the CLO’s debt at lower rates depends on the magnitude of the cost reduction. A general rule is that 10bps of reduction in the CLO’s cost of debt results in 80bps of incremental cash flow to the CLO equity for a middle market CLO levered 8.0x.

What are the causes and effects of lower loan issuance?

Relevant for: Leveraged loans, CLO BBs, and CLO Equity
Leveraged loans are often created in a Leveraged Buyout (LBO). LBO activity has declined since 2021 due to the inability of private equity sponsors and business owners to agree on a purchase price for the business. Higher interest rates in general have resulted in a compression of acquisition multiples that private equity sponsors will pay and many business owners have been unwilling to sell at these lower multiples. As interest rates decline, we would expect LBO activity to rebound to more normalized levels.

Much of primary activity in the loan market this past year resulted from refinancings, repricings and maturity extensions, rather than new LBOs. While new loan creation was down, the quality of new loans that did come to market was high, in our opinion, both in terms of the projected returns of new loans as well as lender-favorable documentation terms.

The decline in new loan activity resulted in stronger bids for higher quality credits in the secondary market. During 2023, the Morningstar Loan Index (“the Loan Index”) increased from 92 to 96. Higher loan prices were a tailwind for CLO equity and CLO BB returns during the year.

Has there been CLO self-healing over the last two years?

Relevant for: CLO BBs and CLO Equity
CLOs typically start their lives with a 4- to 5-year reinvestment period, during which the CLO can reinvest proceeds from loan repayments into new investments. During periods of market turbulence, loans tend to trade down in price. That enables the CLO manager to purchase discounted loans in the secondary market. These discounted purchases can provide a material offset to increased defaults during economic downturns. Discounted loan purchases can enhance the CLO’s credit profile for CLO Note investors and potentially increase returns for CLO Equity investors. We call this the “self-healing” mechanism of CLOs.

The Loan Index ended 2021 at 99, but during the last two years, the Loan Index had an average price of 95.5 This has provided an opportunity for CLOs to buy discounted loans. However, the loans that CLOs invest in tend to be more conservative than the overall Loan Index. We believe that our CLO managers have been able to invest loan repayments at dollar prices between 97-98 throughout the year. This is accretive to CLO equity returns given our usual CLO modeling assumption of a purchase price of 99.

Is there a trend towards lower loan recoveries in the event of default?

Relevant for: Leveraged loans, CLO BBs, and CLO Equity
Our usual base-case CLO modeling assumption is that 2% of the loans will default each year and the recovery rate will be 70%. This can be considered a loan loss reserve. One of our goals is to invest with CLO managers that outperform on these metrics.

For broadly syndicated loans, recovery rates for 2023 were poor, which was a headwind for CLO equity returns. Fortunately, loans default rarely, and the default rate of 2.0% at year-end 2023 was consistent with our modeling assumptions.6 But across the 52 defaults in 2023 tracked by JP Morgan in the syndicated loan market, the recovery rate was 36.4%.

There are two primary reasons why broadly syndicated loan recoveries have been coming in below our typical CLO modeling assumption of 70%:

1. Initial loan to value was marginally higher than in the past, i.e., less equity and unsecured bonds as a % of the initial financing

2. Loose loan documentation did not adequately protect creditors’ rights

While JP Morgan measures the recovery rate of a loan as the trading price 30 days after the loan defaults, that is not the ultimate recovery value. In a default, the lender often ends up with a restructured term loan and an equity investment. In some cases, the equity upside can be substantial, but it takes time for the recovery to play out.

We view low loan recoveries as unique to the broadly syndicated loan market. In the middle market, we believe loan documentation is still creditor friendly, and initial loan-to-values are below 50%.

We expect the impact of loan defaults to be less pronounced on CLO portfolios than on the loan market overall. CLO managers are actively managing their CLO’s underlying loan portfolios to improve average credit quality and ensure the CLO’s compliance with its many tests. Accordingly, CLOs own loans that are much more conservative than the overall Loan Index.

The other important variables that determine CLO equity returns have been tracking favorably: default rate, interest rate, new loan purchase price, and new loan spread. Additional CLO equity upside could exist in 2024 and beyond if we’re able to refinance our CLO’s debt at lower rates or extend their reinvestment periods.
SOURCES

1) S&P Global Market Intelligence, December 2023

2) Flat Rock Global Assumptions, for a borrower levered at 4.5x EBITDA paying a SOFR + 5% interest rate

3) Chicago Mercantile Exchange SOFR Futures

4) JP Morgan CLOIE Index

5) Bloomberg, LLC

6) JP Morgan Default Monitor December 2023

DISCLOSURES

Past performance is not indicative of future results.

This is not an invitation to make any investment or purchase shares in any fund and is intended for informational purposes only. Nothing contained herein constitutes investment, legal, tax or other advice, nor is it to be relied on in making an investment or other decision. Nothing herein should be construed as a solicitation, offer or recommendation to acquire or dispose of any investment, or to engage in any other transaction.

For further information feel free to email info@flatrockglobal.com

20 Dec 2023

Are CLO BB Notes Investment Grade?

CLO Ratings

When a Collateralized Loan Obligation (CLO) is formed, a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO) such as Moody’s Investor Service (Moody’s), Standard and Poor’s (S&P) or Fitch Ratings provide an independent public assessment of the credit quality of the CLO’s financing.

A typical CLO bundles together pools of first lien loans which are financed by issuing a series of debt notes (ranging in rating from AAA to BB) as well as an equity tranche that will absorb the first losses on the loans.

Illustration showing a list of CLO Assets, Liabilities, and Equities
1) These are estimates of the size of broadly syndicated CLO tranches and can vary from CLO to CLO
To rate a CLO’s debt notes, NRSROs consider the underlying ratings of the CLO’s loans, the likely recovery rate of the loans in a default, and how correlated any loan defaults in the CLO’s portfolio are likely to be.

The CLO’s underlying assets, first lien loans, are usually rated B using the S&P ratings scale or B2 using the Moody’s scale. Loan ratings are determined by fundamental factors of the business, such as: firm leverage, interest coverage, historical revenue and profitability growth, and the cyclicality of the business.

A BB rating from S&P, for example, has a qualitative description: “Less vulnerable in the near-term but faces major ongoing uncertainties to adverse business, financial and economic conditions.” A rating also corresponds to quantitative probabilities that the issuer will default over various time periods. The higher the rating, the lower the probability of default.

A portfolio of highly correlated loans presents greater risk to the CLO’s debt notes. As a result, CLOs are required to be highly diversified by issuer and industry category. The ratings process often includes a Monte-Carlo computer simulation model where thousands of potential scenarios of loan losses are modeled. From these simulations, a rating can be assigned.

BB CLOs Appear Structurally Underrated

NRSROs rate many different types of securities: loans, corporate bonds, government bonds, Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS), CLOs, etc. Each rating is standardized to reflect an assessment of credit quality meant to be comparable across all asset types. In other words, a BB rated CLO note should have the same credit quality as a BB rated corporate note.

However, a comparative review of real-world default performance suggests that CLO securities are structurally underrated. CLO BB notes exhibit a 0.22% annualized default rate, which is significantly lower than the 1.45% annualized default rate for Corporate BB notes – by a factor of 6.6x! As shown below, CLO BBs have a default experience that is more similar to corporate credits rated investment grade (BBB or A).
Chart showing security types, ratings, and default rates.
Source: Standard and Poor’s. The time periods correspond to the data sets provided by the agency.

Potential Explanations for Rating Differentials

There are a few reasons why default probabilities may differ between corporates and CLOs. First, defaults in both corporates and CLOs are rare, so calibrating models with matching default probabilities for a given rating can be difficult. At any point in time, CLOs may be outperforming corporates or vice versa. Also, the data set for CLO securities begins in 1997, while the corporate data set begins in 1981.

Default differences may also be the result of today’s CLOs being associated with the failed Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) from the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). While both securities are three letter acronyms beginning with ‘C’, they are very different: CLOs own highly diversified pools of actively managed senior secured loans, while CDOs’ assets were subprime mortgages of dubious credit quality. On a buy-and-hold basis, senior and junior CLO securities performed well through the GFC, while many CDOs saw defaults in securities initially rated AAA. Today’s CLOs have little in common with the CDOs of the past.

An additional potential explanation is that rating agencies do not give credit for the value that a CLO manager provides. Most CLO managers focus on loan portfolios that are more conservative than the overall loan market, and many CLO managers avoid loans that default.

Structural Protections for CLO BB Notes

The most important protection for the CLO BB Note is the initial equity contributed to the CLO, which takes the first losses on the loan portfolio.

If a CLO loan portfolio underperforms (e.g., with too many defaulted loans or loans rated CCC), the CLO has structural protections that can redirect the CLO’s profitability to benefit the CLO’s noteholders. This diverted cash flow can be used to either buy more loans or delever the CLO; both of which results in an increased equity base in the CLO.
Illustration showing a sample CLO loan portfolio
A key question for any investor in a CLO BB is: “What percent of the loans would need to default each year, such that the CLO BB noteholder does not receive all of his contractual interest and principal?” To perform this analysis, a projected recovery rate of the defaulted loans needs to be assumed. CLOs are typically modeled with a 70% recovery rate assumption, with a downside case recovery rate of 50%. The orange line in the graph below shows the actual default rate for the loan market, which peaked at 8% during the GFC and 5% during the COVID-downturn. The horizontal lines show the annual default rate required for the CLO BB to miss any contractual payments.

Illustration showing a line chart, with the orange line showing the actual default rate for the loan market, which peaked at 8% during the GFC and 5% during the COVID-downturn. The horizontal lines show the annual default rate required for the CLO BB to miss any contractual payments.
Internal modeling using Intex, JP Morgan Default Monitor November 2023. Results are from a new issue middle market CLO with a four-year reinvestment period and a broadly syndicated CLO with a five-year reinvestment period. Assumes a pre-payment rate of 25%.
Middle market CLO BBs begin their lives with 12% equity and are therefore highly resilient to loan defaults. Assuming a 70% recovery rate, middle market CLO BBs would survive at almost 2.0x the default rate of the GFC and could withstand such an elevated default rate for a duration of nine years. For a broadly syndicated CLO BB with initial equity of 8%, the default rate required to impair the CLO BB falls to 8%.

Lower projected loan recoveries result in lower required loan default rates for CLO BB impairment. However, even at a 50% recovery rate, CLO BBs can withstand substantial defaults. The above analysis does not capture the power of the CLO’s “self-healing” mechanism. When default rates rise, CLOs in their reinvestment period benefit from being able to buy discounted loans in the market, which provides additional collateral for the CLO BB. The chart above assumes all new loans are bought at a price of 99, which would not be the case in recessionary environment.

Though not pictured in the graph above, the 0.22% default rate for CLO BBs would run almost on top of the x-axis, a sharp contrast to portfolios of loans and high yield bonds that have default rates of ~3% per annum. In short, the data suggests CLO BBs may have significant credit strengths that could correspond to higher ratings than they receive.
DISCLOSURES

Past performance is not indicative of future results. This is not an invitation to make any investment or purchase shares in any fund and is intended for informational purposes only.

Nothing contained herein constitutes investment, legal, tax or other advice, nor is it to be relied on in making an investment or other decision.

Nothing herein should be construed as a solicitation, offer or recommendation to acquire or dispose of any investment, or to engage in any other transaction.

For further information, please email info@flatrockglobal.com
08 Dec 2023

Podcast: Demystifying CLO Myths

Flat Rock Global CIO Shiloh Bates discusses CLOs (Collateralized Loan Obligations) with Macro Hive CEO Bilal Hafeez on the Hive Podcast. Learn more about characteristics of different CLO tranches, CLO issuance, and the self-healing mechanism, to name a few.

DISCLOSURES

The performance data quoted in the podcast represents past performance. Current performance may be lower or higher than the performance quoted in the podcast. lnvestment return and principal value will fluctuate, so that shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost. Past Performance is no guarantee of future results. A Fund’s performance, especially for very short periods of time, should not be the sole factor in making your investment decisions.

Consider the investment risks, charges, and expenses of the Fund carefully before investing. Other information about the Fund may be obtained at https://flatrockglobal.com/flat-rock-opportunity-fund/. Please read it carefully.

Risk: The Fund is suitable for investors who can bear the risks associated with the Fund’s limited liquidity and should be viewed as a long-term investment. Our shares have no history of public trading, nor is it intended that our shares will be listed on a national securities exchange at this time, if ever. No secondary market is expected to develop for our shares; liquidity for our shares will be provided only through quarterly repurchase offers for no less than 5% of and no more than 25% of our shares at net asset value, and there is no guarantee that an investor will be able to sell all the shares that the investor desires to sell in the repurchase offer. Due to these limited restrictions, an investor should consider an investment in the Fund to be of limited liquidity. Investing in our shares may be speculative and involves a high degree of risk, including the risks associated with leverage. Investing in the Fund involves risks, including the risk that shareholder may lose part of or all of their investment. We intend to invest primarily in the equity and, to a lesser extent, in the junior debt tranches of CLOs that own a pool of senior secured loans. Our investments in the equity and junior debt tranches of CLOs are exposed to leveraged credit risk. Investments in the lowest tranches bear the highest level of risk. We may pay distributions in significant part from sources that may not be available in the future and that are unrelated to our performance, such as a returns of capital or borrowing. The amount of distributions that we may pay, if any, is uncertain.

ALPS Control Number: FLT000395

17 Oct 2023

Video: Interval Fund Basics

What is an interval fund? How is an interval fund different from other investment vehicles? Flat Rock Global CIO Shiloh Bates explains interval funds and why he thinks interval funds are growing in popularity.

Hi. I’m Shiloh Bates and I’m the CIO of Flat Rock Global.

Today I want to talk to you guys about interval funds and why we think they’re growing in popularity.

To purchase an interval fund is the same, simple funding mechanism as a U.S. mutual fund. It’s point and click; there is no paperwork. Now there is a daily share price, or NAV, net asset value, and that’s calculated by a third party. That’s the price at which investors can purchase shares of the fund. Now if investors want to sell shares, there’s a process by which they can tender those shares to the fund. And the fund agrees to a repurchase of at least 5% of shares per quarter, or 20% per year.

Now, practically speaking, an investor who wants to tender shares should get back much more than the contractual minimum. That’s because it’s very unlikely that all investors would tender at the same time.

The interval fund structure enables the fund to invest in illiquid assets that have a return premium associated with them. The premium is then passed along to the fund’s investors as dividends over time.

Interval funds make less-liquid asset classes typically reserved for institutional investors available to retail investors without the accredited or qualified investor limitations.

There are four primary reasons we believe interval funds will increasingly take share from private funds or closed-end funds. First, when you decide to invest in an interval fund, you can do it on that business day. You fund it to a portfolio where there’s already assets earning you return. There’s no concept of capital calls. There’s no setting aside cash, waiting for the capital calls to come in. You’re just fully invested on day one. Second, interval funds are SEC-registered and governed by the 1940 Act. And there’s a lot of regulation that goes along with that. For example, you’ll get annual reports, prospectuses, portfolio holdings, and caps on fund leverage, to name a few. But basically it’s the same regulation as a U.S. mutual fund. Third, in the interval fund structure, there’s no concept of trading above or below NAV. And that’s important because, for example, many closed-end funds, including BDCs, perpetually trade below NAV. In closed-end structures, changes in the fund’s discount in premium only adds to the overall share volatility. In the interval fund structure, it’s just not a concept. Fourth, for financial reporting, an investor in an interval fund receives a 1099. There’s no K1. And that’s going to make financial reporting much simpler.

So those are a few of the reasons we’re excited about interval funds. If you have any questions, feel free to reach out.

13 Jul 2023

Common Mistakes in CLO Equity and BB Note Investing

Collateralized Loan Obligation (CLO) Equity is the riskiest tranche of a CLO, but also has the highest return potential, while notes rated BB are usually the CLO’s junior-most debt tranche. Both securities have attractive fundamentals, but it’s important to realize that these securities have some distinct features from other asset classes. Several key differences revolve around market illiquidity, conflicts of interest, CLO structural features, and market size. Below are a few lessons learned from our time in these asset classes:

1. CLO Equity investing, in particular, is not a great investment for investors that do not already have deep relationships in the market.

Imagine a CLO arranger has a $50 million equity tranche to sell in a new CLO. Who gets the first look? Given the investment size, the arranger generally cannot show the deal to multiple potential investors at the same time. That’s because each investor may want a majority of the equity, and if they all want the deal, many will be disappointed. So, the arranger starts with one account, and if that account passes, he moves on to the second. The pecking order is established by who does the most business with the arranger, among other factors. People new to the CLO asset class are going to find themselves last in line and will only see CLO opportunities that multiple others have passed on.

Similarly, it’s important that an investor sees other relevant market trades before making an investment. If you see a one-off trade from a broker dealer, it may end up being a fine investment, but you need to make sure you paid a fair price that is in line with recent market transactions.

2. An investor in CLO Equity should approach the market with the broadest possible mandate.

Many investors who want exposure to CLOs invest with one CLO manager in a GP / LP fund format that will invest in the next several CLO Equity tranches managed by that same manager1. This is an easy but inefficient way to invest. The investible universe of CLO Equity tranches is over 1,600 deals. The options are as follows: 

Primary CLOs – the financial market in which investors purchase newly-issued CLO securities

Secondary CLOs – where investors can buy and sell previously issued CLOs from other investors

CLO Warehouses – short-term financing vehicles provided by an investment bank to CLO managers to accumulate a pool of leveraged loans that will eventually be securitized into a CLO 

Middle Market CLOs – CLOs  with underlying collateral consisting of middle market loans rather than broadly syndicated loans

An investor in a GP / LP manager fund will be targeting the smallest fraction of the investible market, and there will be high overlap of the leveraged loans in each of the CLOs. Slowly waiting for the GP / LP fund to call capital may also be undesirable.

3. A CLO manager may not make the best CLO Equity Investor.

Many CLO Equity investors are also CLO managers, and they effectively market their CLO management skills as being useful in picking CLO Equity investments. However, this can quickly result in some conflicts of interest. Is the CLO Equity investor really looking at the whole market for the best opportunities, or is he simply helping the home team by investing in his firm’s CLOs? Let’s say the CLO Manager has syndicated almost all the CLO Notes for a new deal, but a few unsold parts of the capital structure remain. Perhaps those unwanted securities will end up in the CLO Equity Fund?

4. CLO BB Notes are robust, even when the market value coverage (market value of leveraged loans and cash / CLO debt through the BB Note) is less than 100%.

When the leveraged loan market sells off, potential returns in BB Notes can be equity-like. On its face, it seems very risky to invest in a CLO BB Note when, if the CLO was hypothetically liquidated, the proceeds would not result in full repayment. But, very few CLO BBs have defaulted, and there are two ways that the market value coverage likely ends above 100%, which is a requirement to get a full repayment on the CLO BB Note. First, many of the CLO’s leveraged loans will repay at par, thus increasing the market value coverage over time, as the fair value of the leveraged loans typically are below par. Second, if the CLO’s leveraged loans materially underperform, the diversion of cash flow that would have otherwise gone to the equity will also benefit the market value coverage. Do not underestimate the value of this CLO structural protection for the BB Note. 

5. Allocation to Middle Market CLO Equity and BB Notes has the potential to reduce overall portfolio risk. 

Middle Market CLOs offer exposure to a unique set of levered loans that aren’t represented in other CLOs. Projected equity returns are comparable to CLOs backed by broadly syndicated loans, but middle market loans tend to retain their value better in down markets. Changes in fair value of Middle Market CLO Equity are primarily driven by the actual performance of the underlying levered loans as opposed to technical factors influencing the broadly syndicated leveraged loan market.

1) GP / LP refers to a private fund structure where the General Partner (GP) typically manages assets on behalf of Limited Partners (LPs) who have contributed investment capital. GP / LP funds are not regulated under the investment Company Act of 1940.

DISCLOSURES

Past performance is not indicative of future results.

This Insight article is not an invitation to make any investment or purchase shares in any fund and is intended for informational purposes only. Nothing contained herein constitutes investment, legal, tax or other advice, nor is it to be relied on in making an investment or other decision. Nothing herein should be construed as a solicitation, offer or recommendation to acquire or dispose of any investment, or to engage in any other transaction.

23 Apr 2020
US CLO Issuance

The Underperformance of CLO Risk Retention Funds

On October 21, 2014, the final rules implementing the credit risk retention requirements of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act were issued (the “U.S. Risk Retention Rule”).  U.S. Risk Retention Rule required a CLO manager or affiliate to retain not less than 5% of the credit risk of the assets collateralizing the CLO.  This could be achieved by the CLO manager owning approximately 50% of the CLO’s equity or a 5% vertical slice of all the CLO’s securities rated AAA down to equity.  It was expected that CLO issuance would be negatively affected by these new requirements, but the opposite turned out to be true.  CLO managers were successful in raising risk retention funds from their largest institutional investors, which was used to satisfy the new requirements.

The risk retention requirement ended on April 5, 2018, when it was successfully challenged in court.  However, risk retention funds continue to exist.  The business agreement between the CLO manager and the fund’s investors will likely continue until all the fund’s capital is called. 

US CLO Issuance

Source: Wells Fargo Research, January 2020

Risk retention funds enabled investors to participate pro-rata in a CLO manager’s next several years of issuance, with the largest managers issuing around four new CLOs a year.  The risk retention fund’s investors were often given management fee rebates to entice them into the fund.  However, management fee rebates have been available in the CLO market for a long time and participation in a risk retention fund isn’t required to benefit from them.    

It is our belief that investors in these funds will be disappointed with their returns.  It’s not because CLO equity doesn’t offer favorable risk-adjusted returns.  It’s because the way the funds approach the market is fundamentally flawed. 

To contrast, for an independent investor in CLO equity, the market is large at approximately $60 billion.1  There are over 100 managers issuing new CLOs and over 1,000 existing CLOs that could be invested in.1  Also, many independent investors buy the junior debt securities issued by CLOs when those securities offer high rates.  An independent investor may invest in the primary market when CLOs are created or invest in a CLO that began its life in 2014.  Most independent investors would want to be diversified by CLO manager and by the year of CLO issuance. 

For the the risk retention funds, the investment universe is quite small – subsequent CLOs issued by a single manager.  All other managers and the entire secondary market for CLO equity tranches are excluded.  The pre-selected investment universe is less than 1% of the overall market!  This is a recipe for underperformance. 

In 2019, the debt costs for new CLOs were elevated.  And the difference between the interest earned on the CLO loans and the interest paid on the CLO’s debt (the “arbitrage”) was at multi-year lows.1  At the same time, CLOs issued prior to 2019 were available in the secondary market that provided attractive risk-adjusted returns; that is where many independent CLO investors saw the best value.  However, the risk retention funds continued to call capital and create new CLOs that arguably should not have been formed.  Because the manager of a risk retention fund gets paid on assets under management, the incentive for the manager is to keep creating new CLOs.      

CLO market participants like to break managers into different tiers. For example, a CLO manager that has a large investor following and good historical returns is considered a tier one manager, while a newer CLO manager might be a tier three or four manager.  Since relative returns are constantly changing, managers’ categorizations are changing as well.   An investor in a risk retention fund may find that its long-term commitment is to a CLO manager whose reputation isn’t what it once was.  The independent CLO investor can quickly invest away from underperforming managers.      

Risk retention fund investors may recognize these issues.  At CLO conferences their strategy is discussed with incredulity on various panels.  If these funds truly marked their holdings to market, fund investors would have put pressure on the managers to stop calling capital a long time ago.     

While the CLO market can be difficult to understand for someone who doesn’t work in it daily, I often find it helpful to give analogies to the equity market.  Imagine being approached for a new equity fund with this pitch: “Invest in our fund today, and we will do the next six IPOs underwritten by investment bank X.  We don’t care about the company’s profitability, business model, management team, etc.  We are doing the next six deals!”  It’s hard for me to imagine this being a successful strategy, but that is the equity-equivalent to risk retention fund investing.  

(1) The CLO Market Monthly Overview, February 2020, Wells Fargo Securities

      For further information feel free to email info@flatrockglobal.com